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SUMMARY
The proposition that international law is largely concerned with States—what they do 
and how they behave in relation to one another—has long been one of the most axiomatic 
features of international legal thought. Yet the actual place occupied by the State in such 
thought and practice has always been equally elusive. In one direction, the existence of a 
society of independent States appears to be a necessary presupposition for the discipline—
something that has to precede the identifi cation of those rules or principles that might 
be regarded as forming the substance of international law. In another direction, however, 
statehood is also something that appears to be produced through international law follow-
ing from a need to determine which political communities can rightfully claim to enjoy the 
prerogatives of sovereignty. Whereas in the past, this relationship between law and sover-
eignty could be mediated through an imperial ‘standard of civilization’ that differentiated 
between ‘new’ and ‘old’ States, or European and non-European forms of sovereignty, by the 
middle of the twentieth century such forms of discrimination were no longer tenable. The 
contradictions implicit in the idea of statehood (that it be both antecedent and a product of 
international law) were then to come to the fore demarcating debates as to the implications 
of self-determination (whether determining or determined) and of recognition (whether 
declaratory or constitutive). Intertwined within in such debates are an array of political 
commitments—to democracy and self-government, human rights, and the combating of 
violence—all of which relate thoroughly ambiguously to the role assigned to States within 
international legal thought in the sense that they remain both the source of the problem and 
the mode of emancipation.
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I. introduction
It is a remarkable feature of our contemporary understanding of the world that if forced 
to describe it, we would normally do so in one of two ways. One would be in terms of its 
physical and biological geography (a description of continents, oceans, climate, and plant 
or animal lifeforms); the other in terms of its political geography, as being a world divided 
systematically and uniformly by reference to the territorial parameters of States (as may be 
represented cartographically by the coloured segments within an atlas). 0 at the second 
form of representation appears signi1 cant, is to mark the extraordinary power that that 
idea of the State has come to play in the formation of our social, political, economic and 
cultural world view. Not only is it now an apparently universal institution, but it is one that 
assumes for itself the same kind of permanence and solidity in descriptions of our social 
and political environment that one would normally associate with geological formations 
in the physical world.
Of course, the world has not always existed as we know it today, and States (if we like to 
trace their origins to early forms of political society) have changed much over time (Tilly, 
1992; Morris, 1998, chapter 2). At one stage political authority around the globe could 
largely be described in terms of its relative intensity: those exercising the prerogatives of 
rule generally enjoying high levels of loyalty and allegiance amongst the community in 
more densely populated urban sites, shading o2  in the more remote frontier zones that 
characterized the outer edges of the realm. In place of this disparate and localized form 
of social organization has emerged a global order framed in terms of a European model 
of the nation state marked by the possession of determinate and increasingly non-porous 
boundaries, centralized bureaucratic structures, categorical modes of membership, and 
a singular uniform system of law (Weber, 1978; Giddens, 1985). 0 e purchase of this 
institution upon the political imagination has been such as to ensure not only that the 
daily routine of ‘politics’ remains 1 rmly embedded within its frame (institutionalized, for 
example, in parliamentary debates, elections and campaigns for o3  ce), but that even the 
movements of resistance adopt it as their primary mode of emancipation. 0 e secession-
ist movements active in places as diverse as Bougainville, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Southern Sudan, Somaliland, or West Irian almost invariably seek, as their objective, the 
establishment of an independent State. In some ways, it is hard to think what the alterna-
tive might be.
As much as movements for independence seem, in some respects, to a3  rm the singu-
larity of the state as the primary mode of political organization, they also undeniably lay 
down a challenge before it. Not only do they place in question the authority of the State 
against which they assert their independence, they also put in question the capacity of the 
broader international order to protect or guarantee the integrity of those States which, 
in some respects, constitute its rationale. Not all such initiatives turn out in the same 
way in practice of course. In some, claims to independence are given the de1 nitive seal 
of Statehood by membership in the United Nations (eg Eritrea 1993), in others e2 ective 
self-government continues yet the claim to independent statehood goes decisively unrec-
ognized (eg Somaliland 1996–). Some, furthermore, survive in an apparent twilight zone 
of partial recognition (eg Kosovo 2009–, Palestine 1988–). At such moments, international 
lawyers are o! en asked for advice: is it right or proper for other States to recognize such 
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claims? What are the implications for doing so, or indeed for refusing such recognition? 
How far does institutional membership go to determine the outcome in such cases? What 
consideration should be given to the democratic credentials of the new State or the role 
played by human rights? International lawyers seem to have some kind of expertise here, 
and one that is sought not only by those concerned with the distributional consequences 
of any political change, but by the public at large.
0 e answers, for the most part, are o! en hesitant: ‘it depends’ is usually a stock phrase. 
It ‘depends’ because as much as a community might be able to ground its claims to inde-
pendence in a sense of ethnic, cultural, or historic sense of self-identity, or in terms of its 
abuse at the hands of an ‘alien’ authoritarian elite, there are still broader matters of stability 
or security to be addressed. It depends because as much as one or two States may have seen 
1 t to recognize the new entity, this is not usually su3  cient (albeit the case that it is hard to 
say quite what is su3  cient). It depends because whilst we used to be quite clear about the 
conditions under which new States might come into being, things seem to be changing and 
practice coalescing around new potential rules or principles. It depends because rule and 
practice rarely neatly align and because the law and the politics of recognition appear dif-
1 cult to separate. 0 ese, and many other common concerns, are such as to make de1 nitive 
pronouncement a seemingly precarious business. Yet the fact remains that the creation or 
disappearance of States is not something about which international lawyers are, or indeed 
can be, entirely neutral. 0 ere are always legal consequences attendant to forms of polit-
ical change that involve the alteration of borders (see generally Craven, 2007). More than 
this, however, international lawyers also have an important linguistic and conceptual tool-
box (which includes notions of sovereignty, territory, recognition, personality, and self-
 determination) that provides a language for both projecting and evaluating claims made 
in respect of those processes of political and social change.
In some respects, however, the place assumed by the ‘State’ in international law is 
almost too self-evident. If international law is de1 ned, as it has traditionally, as being the 
law that applies as between sovereign States, then some engagement with States, what they 
are, how they come into being, and how they change has to be part of the disciplinary 
orientation. Yet, the central position assumed by States in legal doctrine is also problem-
atic. In the introduction to his Principles of International Law of 1895 Lawrence suggested 
that ‘[t]he meagre proposition that the Subjects of International Law are Sovereign States 
is o! en put forward as if it contained all the information that need be given about the 
 matter.’ (Lawrence, 1895, p 55) Of course, it wasn’t all the information needed in his view, 
and he then proceeded to set out why that was the case, and why one needed to di2 eren-
tiate, for example, between di2 erent kinds of States and di2 erent forms of sovereignty. 
But at the same time he was aware that the 1 gure of the sovereign State occupied such 
a central position within the discipline of international law that its presence or absence 
was not something that could be adequately conceptualized internally within that same 
framework. Since in absence of sovereign States there was no possibility of international 
law, their existence or demise could only be presupposed, or appreciated at some distance 
from the everyday discourse of an otherwise relational conception of law. One needed, in 
other words, to either postulate the existence of an international society prior to the legal 
relations that are generated within it (in which case regulation only re8 ects back on the 
pre-existent ‘fact’ of a State’s existence) or to conceive of the place occupied by States as 
being part of a much broader and diverse cosmopolitan universe that somehow attributes 
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legal competences to designated actors (which would include States or governments but 
would not necessarily be con1 ned to them). In the event, Lawrence wanted to have it both 
ways—States were, for him, a presupposition in the sense that they existed as factual orders 
of power quite independently of their legal relations, but whose emergence and entry into 
the international family of nations could also be regulated.
For all the di3  culties that Lawrence and other international lawyers had in grasping 
or conceptualizing the place of the sovereign State within their discipline, they were in no 
doubt as to its importance, or of the central role assumed by it in international relations. 
A hundred years later, however, talk of both the exclusivity of States as subjects of inter-
national law and of States as primary actors in international relations is largely regarded 
as an antiquated, if not wholly, misleading proposition. Within international law itself, the 
recognition given to the rights and responsibilities of international organizations, to the 
rights and duties of individuals and a variety of di2 erent groups or communities of one 
form or another (minorities, indigenous peoples, corporations), has made the language 
of exclusive ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’ of international law largely redundant. Non-State actors 
(whether non-governmental organizations or international organizations) are playing an 
increasingly important role in treaty making, and the 1 gure of the ‘international commu-
nity’ is repeatedly invoked (in the context, for example, of the elaboration of erga omnes 
obligations) as an entity having some, albeit still rather vague, legal status.1 Increasingly 
frequently, furthermore, the notion of ‘sovereignty’ has become seen as either redundant 
or as a dangerous 1 ction, and ‘Statism’ a derogatory label attached to any approach to 
international law that is seen to prioritize what States do or say at the expense of individu-
als and communities over whom they hold authority (see Marks, 2006).
Several considerations have informed this change in disciplinary orientation—some of 
which may be attributed to the somewhat elusive phenomenon of ‘globalization’, some to 
the dynamics of the post-cold war world. In an article written sometime before the attack 
on the World Trade Centre (which, of course, spawned several new re8 ections upon the 
role of non-State actors of one kind or another), Oscar Schachter (1998) was to re8 ect 
upon the ‘decline of the Nation state’ which he observed as being evidenced in four related 
developments:
0 e growth, and increased mobility, of capital and technology (enhanced by (i) 
global communications networks), coupled with a decreasing capacity to regulate 
foreign direct investment or protect national producers through tari2  or non-
tari2  barriers, has undermined the centrality of the State in the organization of 
the economy. 0 e age of capital-exporting imperialism or defensive mercantilism 
is over, and ‘the superiority of markets over state control is almost universally 
accepted’ (Schachter, 1998, p 10).
0 e phenomenal growth of organized non-governmental movements operating (ii) 
across national borders in 1 elds such as human rights, the environment and 
disarmament (but also including scienti1 c and technical bodies) have become a 
force for mobilization and political change ‘in areas long seen as domestic’ and 
have fostered ‘new social identities that cross national lines’ (Schachter, 1998, 
1 See eg ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Articles 
33, 42, 48.
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p 13). 0 e enhanced role of this nascent international ‘civil society’ has also 
been paralleled in the emergence of a new transnational ‘uncivil society’ of drug 
tra3  ckers, arms traders, terrorists, and money launderers whose power has vastly 
increased as a consequence of the emergence of new communication networks 
and the deregulation of 1 nancial markets. All of these activities underscore ‘the 
weakness of nation-states and of the international legal system’ (Schachter, 1998, 
p 15).
0 e (re)emergence of a range of sub-state ‘identities’ that have increasingly (iii) 
challenged the central authority of the juridical State. On one side, the old anti-
colonial policy of self-determination has led to the emergence of a much broader 
array of secessionist movements demanding forms of autonomy or self-government 
the claims of which are located in a sense of historical, cultural, linguistic, or 
religious di2 erence (Schachter, 1998, p 16). On the other side, as Franck argued, 
globalization has led to the emergence of new modes of loyalty and community 
that are neither ‘genetic nor territorial’, but rather focused upon a range of 
increasingly transnational agendas such as human rights, the environment, or 
feminism (Franck, 1996). 0 is ‘modern type of cosmopolitanism’, in Schachter’s 
view can again be seen to be an indication of the ‘decline in the authority of the 
State’ (Schachter, 1998, p 18).
Finally, and for Schachter the ‘most dramatic’ example, of the decline in State (iv) 
authority, is identi1 ed with the emergence of a new phenomenon of ‘failed States’ 
(examples of which he cites as being Liberia, Somalia, and Afghanistan) in which 
government and civil order have virtually disappeared, and in which the survival of 
the State depends upon concerted international action. 0 us in Cambodia a costly 
and elaborate ‘rescue e2 ort’ was put in place involving UN oversight of a process 
of internal reconstruction that included elections, the creation of a reconciliation 
process and the establishment of constitutional government. For a period of two 
years, although Cambodia formally remained a State for international purposes, 
its government ‘did not have full freedom to direct the internal a2 airs of the 
country’ (Schachter, 1998, p 18).
All of these, in Schachter’s view, posed challenges to a global order of States regulated by 
rules of international law, but were not in themselves su3  cient to warrant fundamentally 
changing either our ideas about international society or of the way in which international 
law itself was conceptualized. Despite the trends, he concludes that ‘it is most unlikely 
that the state will disappear in the foreseeable future’. Not only has the State provided the 
structures of authority needed to cope with the ‘incessant claims of competing societal 
groups’, it still promises dignity and protection for the individual with access to common 
institutions and the equal protection of the law (Schachter, 1998, p 22). For Schachter, then, 
the key question was not so much whether the State as such would survive, but whether 
international law could adjust to such phenomena and respond to the changing demands 
of the environment in which it operated.
Whether or not one accepts Schachter’s con1 dence in this respect, it is evident that 
there are broadly two themes that are interwoven here: one is a sociological re8 ection 
on the changing character of international society and the declining power or author-
ity of the nation state, which has given rise to the elaboration of new schemes of legal 
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responsibility and control for purposes of buttressing or replacing those exercised by 
States themselves.2 0 e other is an ethical variant which regards the tradition of state 
 ‘sovereignty’ to be an archaic impediment to the pursuit of humanitarian or other cos-
mopolitan agendas (human rights, environmental protection, etc) and which has recom-
mended various interventionist policies of a unilateral or multilateral character. In some 
ways, of course, these two forms of re8 ection work against each other: the 1 rst believ-
ing States to be increasingly marginalized by social forces that escape their regulative or 
coercive capabilities; the second believing that States retain an authority that needs to be 
dismantled before emancipatory agendas may be put in place. Where they meet, however, 
is in an alarming vision of global order in which the State as political agent instructed 
with the task of ‘mediating’ between the individual and the general interest (as Hegel 
would put it) has neither the ability nor competence to resist a global civil society that 
claims both power and justice on its own side.3
II. history
At the beginning of the Fourth Edition of his in8 uential Treatise on International Law 
prepared for publication in 1895 shortly before his death, Hall was to start (much as he had 
in his earlier editions) with a succinct de1 nition:
International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern civilised states regard 
as being binding on them in their relations with one another with a force comparable in 
nature and degree to that binding the conscientious person to obey the laws of his country, 
and which they also regard as being enforceable by appropriate means in case of infringe-
ment. (Hall, 1895, p 1)
0 is statement was remarkable in several respects. To begin with, there is the question 
of tone: this is not the beginning of an enquiry, or a speculation that has to be situated in 
some historical context. 0 ere is no attempt to locate his subject in contemporary debate 
or practice. 0 is is international law written as science, beginning (as indeed seemed nec-
essary) with a de1 nition. International law it is not merely a language, or a way of describ-
ing certain activities or practices. It is already a thing with de1 nite content and there to 
be described. 0 e description itself, of course, is signi1 cant. 0 e content of international 
law is to be found, as far as Hall is concerned, in rules of conduct which Sates regard as 
binding upon them. 0 is demands no access to a world of natural law (whether religious 
or rational), or engagement with the complex of social and political relations that consti-
tute the authority of each of the States involved. Still less is there any requirement to speak 
about that complex idea—sovereignty—which John Austin had placed at the heart of his 
description of law. International law was simply to be located in an empirical practice of 
consent and obligation. At the heart of it, of course, was the ‘modern civilised State’ whose 
actions were both the object and measure of this science. One needed a community of 
2 See, for example, proposals relating to the development of ‘Global Administrative Law’ (Kingsbury, 
Krisch, and Stewart, 2005) or other initiatives directed towards the development of the accountability of 
non-State actors more generally (Clapham, 2006).
3 See Hardt and Negri, 2000, p 15: ‘Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the 
capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace’.
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civilized States for there to be rules of conduct. One needed also for those States to have 
a will, or consciousness, as to the binding force of their commitments (opinio iuris). One 
needed, furthermore, for those States to understand that they had committed themselves 
to a system of law warranting the enforcement ‘by appropriate means’. 0 e 1 gure of the 
State thus stood at centre stage around which an elaborate architecture of legal rules was 
to be described and generated.
At the time at which Hall was writing, nearly all treatises on international law began 
in similar manner and would be followed by one or more chapters containing an extem-
porized discussion of the State as the primary subject of international law (See Westlake, 
1904; Twiss, 1884; Lawrence, 1895; Wheaton, 1866; Phillimore, 1871). Typically this 
 section or chapter would seek to de1 ne what was meant by a State for purposes of inter-
national law, determine who or what would count for such purposes, and address matters 
of classi1 cation (distinguishing perhaps between ‘sovereign’ or ‘semi sovereign’ States, 
and identifying vassals, protectorates, and unions as particular classes) and passing com-
ment on di3  culties of nomenclature (whether everything called a State could be treated 
as a State and whether States di2 ered from ‘nations’). In the process there would usually 
also be some associated re8 ections upon the notion of ‘sovereignty’ and what that might 
mean in the context of international relations and of the putative role that ‘recognition’ 
might play.
0 is format was not merely a haphazard aesthetic choice, but re8 ected in large measure 
a desire to lay down in ordered manner the principle axioms or presuppositions of the dis-
cipline that might therea! er be deployed in a variety of di2 erent particular contexts. Once 
in other words, one had established who the subjects of law were, and the framework for 
determining the extent and scope of their rights and obligations (ie sources), one could go 
on to apply those principles to a range of more concrete matters such as the law of the sea, 
the protection of nationals abroad or belligerent relations. 0 e fact that this discussion of 
States and their character was always the starting point—almost a professional a priori as 
Koskenniemi has put it—was signi1 cant in more ways than one. In one respect, it bespoke 
of a changing attitude towards the sources of international law re8 ecting the determina-
tion to identify international law so far as possible with the speci1 c determinants of state 
practice and consent rather than with the inherited tradition of natural rights. In another 
respect however it also spoke of the central position that had come to be assumed by ‘the 
State’ understood as an idea quite distinct from many of its earlier designations—whether 
that be the people, the nation, civil society, the sovereign, the monarch, or the multitude. 
Whilst Hall, like many others, continued to use Bentham’s terminology in describing his 
subject matter (international law), he no longer attributed any signi1 cance to the ‘nation’ 
as such.
As much as Hall and others were to mark themselves out from their intellectual pred-
ecessors, they nevertheless uniformly saw themselves as working in a well-established tra-
dition. 0 is was a tradition understood to have its roots in the Roman Law notion of the jus 
gentium as subsequently received and modi1 ed through the work of those such as Suarez, 
Ayala, Gentili, Grotius, Bynkershoek, Pufendorf, Wol2 , and de Vattel. In many respects 
what seemed to tie these classic works together as a tradition was not simply their espousal 
of the existence of a law that transcended the sovereign, but in the fact that the adumbrated 
jus gentium (or, in some works, the jus inter gentes) necessarily presupposed the existence 
of a plurality of sovereign subjects (whatever the particular terminology) all of which had 
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‘external’ relations that would be regulated by its terms. A key moment in this story, thus, 
was the development of a secular international society within Europe the inauguration of 
which was marked by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, in which that community 1 nally 
emerged from the shadow of the Holy Roman Empire and the coercive authority of the 
Catholic Church (Hall, 1895, pp 55–60).
0 is emphasis given to the Peace of Westphalia was signi1 cant at a systemic level since 
it su3  ced for such purposes to think of international society as a society of independent 
sovereigns. But this of course said very little about the State itself as an idea, the mean-
ing and signi1 cance of which certainly did not stay stable over the ensuing centuries. As 
Machiavelli’s account in ! e Prince suggested the archetypal sixteenth century sovereign 
existed, ‘in a relationship of singularity and externality’, or of ‘transcendence’, to his or her 
principality (Foucault, 2007, p 91). Since the Prince could receive his principality by inher-
itance, acquisition, conveyance, or conquest, it was clear there was nothing but a synthetic 
link between the two. 0 e principality, including both its territory and population, thus 
stood in a quasi-feudal relation to the Prince’s authority, and international relations pro-
ceeded on the assumption that what was in issue was the rights, possessions, entitlements 
and obligations of the person of the sovereign.
By the time at which Grotius and Pufendorf were writing in the following century, 
however, two new traditions of thought had started to emerge. One of these, marked by 
an invocation of the idea of the social contract (partially present in the work of Grotius, 
but later given much more concrete form in the work of Hobbes and Locke), sought to 
forge a de1 nitive link between the people (understood as a community of individuals or 
as a ‘multitude’) and the sovereign (the individual or group of people who were endowed 
with the right to rule). 0 e other tradition, which was associated with the emergence of 
mercantilist thought in the seventeenth century, began conceptualizing the territory 
and people in terms of a unit of economic activity (Foucault, 2007). Since sovereignty, 
as Locke in particular was to aver, was underpinned by the appropriation and use of 
land,4 the idea developed that the exercise of sovereign rights ought to be oriented in that 
direction: the people should be governed and not merely ruled. Alongside, therefore, the 
emergence of a new ‘art of government’ de1 ned in terms of some innate purpose (raison 
d’état as it was to become known), there also emerged the notion of the ‘State’ as an idea 
that framed the respective component elements of territory, population and govern-
ment but yet was reducible to none of them. Both of these traditions of thought were 
important in the developing idea of the State. On the one hand the State internalized the 
idea of government (which, in Pufendorf ’s terms, could be Democratic, Aristocratic, or 
Monarchical) and set it in relation to the people and its territory. Governments might 
come and go yet the State, so long as it retained the core elements, would remain the 
same. On the other hand, the State was not to be de1 ned merely in terms of a relation-
ship between its component parts, but in the idea that it also had some immanent end—
whether that be simply to maintain common peace and security or further the cause 
of society. 0 e State was thus to be described both in terms of its composition and its 
purpose.
4 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 1690, pp 18–30. See also Vattel, ! e Law of Nations, pp 37–8: ‘0 e 
whole earth is designed to furnish sustenance for its inhabitants; but it cannot do this unless it be cultivated. 
Every Nation is therefore bound by the natural law to cultivate the land which has fallen to its share’.
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Both of these strands of thought come to be neatly expressed in Pufendorf ’s de1 nition 
of the State as a ‘compound Moral Person, whose will being united and tied together by 
those covenants which before passed amongst the multitude, is deemed the will of all, to 
the end that it may use and apply the strength and riches of private persons towards main-
taining the common peace and security’. (Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, 
Bk VII, c. 2, s. 13). A key feature of this de1 nition, which itself had been anticipated in 
Hobbes’ description of the Leviathan, was the personi1 cation of the State as a moral entity 
in its own right. To describe the State as a ‘person’, a moral or legal entity, had several 
obvious consequences. One was that it allowed jurists to di2 erentiate between the interior 
and exterior of the State as Bodin had suggested (Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, 
pp 51–77), and accordingly treat di2 erences in the internal order or structure of states as 
largely irrelevant to their character as homogenous subjects of the law of nations. Another 
was that it allowed a separation between the location of sovereignty and the incidental 
exercise of sovereign powers—a distinction which later cemented itself in a 1 rm di2 er-
entiation that survives today between the idea of the State on the one hand and that of 
government on the other.
All of this was to pave the way for the subsequent work of Wol2  and Vattel, who had, 
perhaps, the most profound in8 uence on the character of international law as it was to 
develop in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Both Wol2  and Vattel, whilst dif-
fering in many important respects, insisted upon the pertinence of the ‘domestic anal-
ogy’ for understanding international law. 0 ey re-appropriated the earlier conception of 
the ‘state of nature’ that had been deployed as a heuristic device in the work of Hobbes 
and Locke for purposes of elaborating their contractarian schemes of political authority, 
and posited it as being a principal characteristic of international society. For Wol2  and 
Vattel, States were in a position analogous to individuals prior to the establishment of 
civil society seeking security and community in their relations with others. 0 e princi-
pal objective of the State was to preserve and protect itself and be given the opportunity 
to promote its own ends. 0 ey thus enjoyed the same rights ‘as nature gives to men for 
the ful1 lment of their duties’ (Vattel, ! e Law of Nations, p 4) and enjoyed such natural 
liberties as be1 tted their character. 0 e law of nations provided the structure by which 
that freedom and equality was to be preserved and promoted within the frame of a wider 
international society.
In many respects it is di3  cult to underestimate the enduring signi1 cance of Vattel’s 
appealingly simplistic account of the State in international relations. However far inter-
national thought may have moved away from the idea of States enjoying certain natural 
prerogatives, or of sovereignty being sharply demarcated between internal and external 
domains, the idea that the world could be described in terms of States as a sociological 
category, possessing a distinct ‘will’, ‘mentality’, or ‘motivation’ that may encourage them 
to interact with one another in certain determinate ways is one that endures to this day. 
Its social purchase is nothing short of astonishing. Nevertheless, for those receiving this 
tradition in the nineteenth century there were always evident complexities that had to be 
negotiated. To begin with, it was not exactly easy to translate this monadic description 
of international society as a society of ‘free and independent’ nations into practice at the 
time. Writing in the middle of the century, for example, Phillimore was to identify eleven 
di2 erent categories of State, four of which were ‘peculiar’ cases (Poland, Belgium, Greece, 
and Egypt), the rest of which included, in addition to States under one sovereign, two 
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categories of Unions, States that took the form of Free Towns or Republics, Tribute-paying 
States (Vassals), and two further categories of States under di2 erent forms of protection. 
Further to this, there was the complex phenomenon of the German Confederation (a loose 
alliance of 70 independent ‘States’) to be explained (Phillimore, 1871, p 101). 0 is was, on 
no account, a uniform scheme of political organization.
By the end of that century, the picture had become still more complex, primarily as a 
consequence of a re8 ection upon the extent to which international law could be applied 
with equal ease in relation to the non-European world (a concern which had been explicitly 
taken up by the newly-formed Institut de Droit International in 18795). 0 e problem was 
this: in their desire to avoid the abstract rationalism of natural law and locate international 
rights and obligations instead in the empiricism of practice and custom, international 
 lawyers had come to speak about international law in speci1 cally European terms. At a 
time at which the idea of the nation as a cultural and linguistic community was emerg-
ing in a speci1 cally political form (demanding an alignment between nation and State), 
it seemed obvious that the international relations of such a community of nation-States 
would be imbued with, or built upon, the same consciousness of history and tradition. 
Custom seemed to imply some kind of social consensus, and consensus a commonality 
of understanding and outlook (what Westlake referred to as a ‘juridical consciousness’) 
that could only readily be supposed in relation to ‘civilized’ communities in Europe (or 
those communities of ‘European origin’ elsewhere). For some, in fact, international law 
was actually more properly described as the Public Law of Europe as the work of those such 
as Martens (1864) and Klüber (1851) attests.
Yet for all this, international lawyers were also aware of the long history of treaty-
making with all manner of local sovereigns in Asia, Africa and elsewhere the form 
of which seemed to suppose that those relations were to be governed by the terms of 
international law (see Alexandrowicz, 1967; Anghie 2005). Indeed the fact that from the 
early 1880s onwards European exploration of the interior of Africa was to be marked, 
amongst other things, by the systematic and widespread conclusion of treaties with local 
kings and chiefs providing for ‘Protection’ or for the ‘cession’ of sovereignty was only 
to make the issue more pressing. How might an exclusively European system of public 
law conceive of such arrangements? And what might this imply as regards the status of 
those communities?
In one sense the answer was obvious. Although few international lawyers at the time 
were to explicitly introduce into their de1 nitions of the State an explicit requirement that 
they be ‘civilized’,6 the existence of an implicit ‘standard of civilization’ ran through most 
of their work in relation to recognition or territorial title, or when describing the char-
acter of international law (Gong, 1984; Anghie, 2005). 0 us, whilst Hall spoke in quite 
abstract terms about the ‘marks of an independent state’ (being permanently established 
for a political end, possessing a de1 ned territory and being independent of external con-
trol) he was still to make clear that international law consisted of those rules of conduct 
which ‘modern civilised states’ regarded as being binding upon them. (Hall, 1895, p 1) One 
could not, in other words, assume that simply because there existed treaty relations with 
5 Twiss, 1879–1880, p 301. See generally Koskenniemi, 2001, pp 98–178.
6 See eg Phillimore, 1871, p 94. Occasionally, the point was made more explicit. See Westlake, 1894, 
pp 102–103; Lawrence, 1895, p 58.
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non-European States such as China or Japan, that those latter States were to be regarded as 
having the same rights and privileges as other European States. As Lawrence was to note:
there are many communities outside the sphere of International Law, though they are 
 independent states. 0 ey neither grant to others, nor claim from themselves the strict 
observance of its rules. Justice and humanity should be scrupulously adhered to in all deal-
ings with them, but they are not 1 t subjects for the application of legal technicalities. It 
would, for instance, be absurd to expect the king of Dahomey to establish a Prize Court, 
or to require the dwarfs of the central African forest to receive a permanent diplomatic 
 mission. (Lawrence, 1895, p 58)
By and large, thus, international lawyers began to di2 erentiate in their accounts between 
those ‘normal’ relations that pertained between European States and those that character-
ized relations with other political communities on the outside. Beyond Europe, the treaties 
that put in place regimes of Protection or for consular jurisdiction and extraterritoriality, 
or those that purported to ‘cede’ territory, took the form of agreements between sovereign 
States, the substance of which however was to deny any such pretension.
Yet there was also a paradoxical di3  culty here. Even if such non-European States did 
not possess a sovereignty equivalent to that of European States, it was not convenient to 
deny them status of any kind, as to do so would have put in question the validity of the 
agreements upon which European privileges seemed to depend (Koskenniemi, 1989, 
pp 136–143). Some position within the broader frame of international law had to be found 
for them. 0 ey had to be simultaneously included yet excluded from the realm of inter-
national law.7 In the event, there were several di2 erent ways in which this matter was 
approached. Some di2 erentiated between legal relations as might exist between European 
States and non-legal, moral, or ethical, propositions that governed relations with the non-
civilized world (Westlake, 1894, pp 137–140), some di2 erentiated between States enjoying 
full membership and those enjoying merely partial membership in the family of nations 
(Wheaton, 1866; Oppenheim, 1905), some di2 erentiated between plenary and partial rec-
ognition (Lorimer, 1883, pp 101–123). One point was clear, however, namely that in order 
to be admitted into the European family of nations, those aspirant States had to demon-
strate their ‘civilized’ credentials. To be ‘civilized’ furthermore, largely meant the cre-
ation of institutions of government, law, and administration modelled upon those found 
in Western Europe (Westlake, 1894, pp 141–143). 0 is was a message fully understood in 
Japan whose rapid process of ‘Westernization’ in the latter half of the ninteenth century 
eventually allowed it to rid itself of the regimes of consular jurisdiction that had been put 
in place in order to insulate Western merchants and traders from the application of local 
law. Only once this ‘badge of imperfect membership’ had been removed could it be said to 
have become a full member of international society (Westlake, 1894, p 46).8
7 Schmitt. 1974, p 233, examining Rivier’s Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts (1889), notes that his overview of 
‘current sovereign states’ included 25 States in Europe, 19 in the Americas, then ‘States in Africa’ including 
the Congo Free State, the Free State of Liberia, the Orange Free State, the Sultanate of Morocco, and the 
Sultanate of Zanzibar. Schmitt notes that in respect of the latter category these were called States but the 
word sovereign was avoided and in case of Morocco and Zanzibar, Rivier had noted that ‘obviously’ they 
did ‘not belong to the community of international law’. Schmitt asks pithily: ‘Why were they even included 
in the enumeration?’
8 A contrast might be drawn here with the rather slower progress made in the case of China. 0 e Nine 
Power Treaty of 1922 sought to guarantee the ‘Open Door’ policy in China (by which was meant ‘equality of 
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0 ese ideas, it has to be said, by no means disappeared overnight. Indeed many of them 
were remodelled and given institutional form in the League of Nations. Article 38(1)(c) 
of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice still referred to ‘the general 
principles of law recognized by civilised nations’, and the theme was maintained in the 
institutions of the Mandate system designed to deal with the situation of the colonies and 
territories extracted from Germany and the Ottoman empire under the terms of the vari-
ous Peace Treaties. Under article 22 of the Covenant on the League, ‘advanced nations’ 
(viz Britain, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan) were 
entrusted with the task of exercising ‘tutelage’ on behalf of the League over those colo-
nies and territories which were ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves 
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. 0 e purpose of this ‘sacred trust’ 
was to advance the ‘well-being and development of such peoples’ the precise implications 
of which depended upon a classi1 cation set out within that same article. Certain territo-
ries (designated as Class A Mandates) were regarded as having ‘reached a stage of devel-
opment where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized’ 
in which case the Mandatory power was to provide administrative advice and assistance 
‘until such time as they are able to stand alone’. 0 is category included those territories in 
the Middle East separated from the Ottoman Empire (Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon). Class B territories (those in Africa with the exception of South-West 
Africa) were to be subject to signi1 cantly more intensive degrees of administrative control 
without any explicit expectation of independence, and Class C territories (Paci1 c Islands 
and South West Africa) were those declared to be ‘best administered under the laws of the 
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory’, subject to certain safeguards ‘in the inter-
ests of the indigenous population’ (see Anghie, 2005, pp 115–195).
Whilst, as Schwarzenberger suggested, the Mandate system came very close to being a 
mechanism for the continuation of colonialism ‘by other means’ (Schwarzenberger, 1950, 
p 134), the very decision to employ ‘other means’ was signi1 cant. To begin with, the insti-
tution of an international trusteeship seemed to make clear that Mandate powers were not 
acquiring such territories as ‘colonies’, and therefore could not be taken to enjoy the nor-
mal rights of sovereignty in relation to such territories. But if that was the case, it posed the 
obvious question as to where sovereignty lay (Wright, 1930). 0 e territories themselves, 
could barely be described as sovereign in their own right, as otherwise the restrictions on 
their independence would have been intolerable. Some other status had to be devised for 
them, or at least some language that avoided the problematic implications of the notion 
of ‘sovereignty’. 0 is, of course, was not a problem solely related to the institution of the 
Mandate, but was equally relevant to the authority exercised by the League of Nations 
itself—how might its powers be described within an international order comprising of 
sovereign States?
Whether or not as a consequence of re8 ecting upon such problems, international law-
yers began to regard the notion of sovereignty and its correlates (sovereign equality and 
opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations’) to be secured by barring any agreement that 
might secure special commercial privileges for any one State. A special Commission was set up to examine 
the question as to whether the continuation of extraterritorial privileges was justi1 ed. It reported back in 
1926 concluding that although progress had been made, more was needed before such regimes could be 
suspended. See Summary and Recommendations of the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in 
China, 1926 in (1927) 21 AJIL, Supplement 58.
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domestic jurisdiction) not as something integral to their understanding of international 
law, but as an obstacle to be overcome. For many, a 1 xation with the idea of sovereignty 
as both indicative of the absence of any higher authority, and as the source of law (under-
stood, perhaps, as the will or command of the sovereign) had not only le!  the discipline 
in a condition of internal contradiction,9 but ill-equipped to deal with a world of new 
international institutions and novel forms of governance. Writing in 1924, for example, 
Brierly joined the emerging chorus, dismissing the idea of sovereignty as an ‘idolon thea-
tre’ (theatrical arti1 ce) that bore little relation to the way in which States actually related to 
one another in practice (Brierly, 1924, p 13). If ‘sovereignty’ was to be retained as an idea it 
had, at the very least, to be re-packaged or re-shaped in some signi1 cant way.
One can turn to Hall’s Treatise of 1895 as an early illustration of this change. One 
of the most signi1 cant features of the Treatise is its almost total avoidance of the term 
‘sovereignty’ except in relation to those matters which were presumptively ‘internal’ 
such as might engage the relationship between the State and its subjects. In place of the 
word  ‘sovereignty’ when describing the existence or authority of the State, he used the 
term ‘personality’. Legal personality, of course, was a term that had already acquired a 
prominence in municipal law with the development of the limited liability corporation, 
but was not a term that had been extensively employed (at that time) in the context of 
international law. Its signi1 cance, however, lay in the fact that the idea of ‘personality’ 
assumed the existence of a systemic order that attributed a range of competences to cer-
tain designated actors. Just as a corporation, if duly brought into being, would then have 
the legal capacity to sue and be sued, so also one might think that States could similarly 
be understood to have been ‘accorded’ a certain capacity in international law. Statehood 
in that context, was no longer something intrinsic, carrying with it certain natural rights 
or prerogatives (and one may think here, for example, of the idea of an ‘inherent’ right to 
self-defence), but descriptive of a capacity attributed or accorded to certain entities ful-
1 lling the requisite criteria.10 In contrast to the Vattelian idea of States enjoying a natural 
liberty in a state of nature, for Hall this liberty of action was one ‘subject to law’ (Hall, 
1895, p 24).
0 is semantic turn was one that may be appreciated not merely in a shi!  in linguistic 
usage from sovereignty to personality (as by no means everyone took that step), but also 
in an active reconceptualization of the idea of sovereignty itself.11 0 us, in the Wimbledon 
case, when presented with the claim by Germany that the granting of an unfettered right 
of passage to vessels of all nationalities through the Kiel canal would ‘imply the abandon-
ment by Germany of a personal and impresciptible right, which forms an essential part 
9 Kennedy, 1997, p 114 associates a scepticism of sovereignty with positivism: ‘To ful1 l their polemical 
mission, to render plausible a legal order among sovereigns, the philosophy which sets this question, which 
makes sovereigns absolute or requires a sovereign for legal order, must be tempered, if not rejected. As a 
result, to inherit positivism is also to inherit a tradition of response to the scepticism and deference to abso-
lute State authority, which renders legal order among sovereigns implausible in the 1 rst place’.
10 See O’Connell, 1970, Vol I, p 80: ‘It is clear that the word “person” is used to refer to one who is a legal 
actor, but that it is of no assistance in ascertaining who or what is competent to act. Only the rules of interna-
tional law may do this, and they may select di2 erent entities and endow them with di2 erent legal functions, 
so it is a mistake to suppose that merely by describing an entity as a “person” one is formulating its capacities 
in law’.
11 For a more recent account of the transformation of sovereignty into a new global form of Empire see 
Hardt and Negri, 2000.
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of her sovereignty’ the Permanent Court of International Justice responded by stating 
that it:
declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or 
refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any 
convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction on the exercise of sover-
eign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But 
the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.12
Sovereignty, in other words, was not to be understood as an unfettered freedom from 
 external constraint, but rather as a way of describing a capacity for binding others to, 
and being bound by, international law. It was no longer something that had any innate 
content (such as describing certain natural rights or prerogatives), nor something that 
could be raised as an objection to legal obligations once entered into.13 It was merely 
a way of describing those remaining powers and liberties a2 orded to the State under 
international law.
0 is new way of thinking was undoubtedly helpful in several respects. To begin with, 
it allowed a dissociation between the possession of ‘sovereign rights’ on the one hand 
and the actual order of power on the other: territories under belligerent occupation,14 
subject to a treaty of Protection or placed under the administration of a Mandatory 
power could be conceived as being subject to the governmental authority of another yet 
not part of its territorial sovereignty. Sovereignty in such cases survived in suspended 
form. It also disposed of the problem of sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction: 
States could regard themselves as equal, so long as it was clear that ‘equality’ meant an 
equal capacity to enjoy rights and bear obligations. 0 ey also retained a right of domes-
tic jurisdiction so far as this described a residual domain of freedom le!  untrammelled 
by the constraints of external obligation.15 It was only a short move from here to the 
position adopted by Kelsen, amongst others, that States were nothing but legal orders, 
described fully and completely in terms of propositions of law.16 It was also only a short 
step to admitting that States were not the only legal subjects contemplated under the 
terms of the international legal order—there was nothing to exclude the possibility of 
other agents, whether that be international organizations, individuals, or other groups, 
from being described as having some measure of international personality even if not on 
a par with that enjoyed by States.
12 S. S. ‘Wimbledon’, Judgments, 1923, PCIJ, Series A, No 1, at p 25.
13 See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, para 259: ‘A State . . . is sovereign for purposes of accept-
ing a limitation of its sovereignty’.
14 See Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (1907).
15 One may note, in that respect, the same reconceptualization occurring in relation to the notion of 
‘domestic jurisdiction’. See eg, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory opinion, 1923, 
PCIJ, Series B, No 4, p 24: ‘0 e question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of 
a state is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations.’
16 Kelsen, 1942, pp 64–65: ‘0 e State is not its individuals; it is the speci1 c union of individuals, and this 
union is the function of the order which regulates their mutual behaviour . . . One of the distinctive results 
of the pure theory of law is its recognition that the coercive order which constitutes the political community 
we call a state, is a legal order. What is usually called the legal order of the state, or the legal order set up by 
the state, is the state itself.’
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Yet for all the determination to formalize Statehood and oppose an inherited tradition 
that associated sovereignty with the possession of certain determinate rights and obliga-
tions, there was a strongly resistant current in the shape of the principle of national self-
determination. National self-determination, in the form advanced by President Wilson in 
1918 (see below) implied a substantive conception of the State rooted in ideas of community 
and cultural homogeneity, determined perhaps by religious or linguistic markers. 0 e sov-
ereignty that this idea demanded was not one that would be regulated from outside, but 
that inhered in a determinate people with values and interests that required protection and 
advancement. To the extent that the promotion of national self-determination seemed to 
go hand in hand with the simultaneous juridi1 cation of sovereignty meant that legal doc-
trine was systematically cut through by an opposition between two ideas of Statehood (one 
formal, the other substantive) and two ideas of sovereignty (one innate, the other attributed 
or delegated) of which neither could ultimately attain ascendancy (Koskenniemi, 1989, 
pp 59–60, 224–233). 0 is opposition, indeed, was to continue to infect the discourse on 
statehood through the period of decolonization and on into the new millennium—its pres-
ence being felt in debates as to the relationship between self-determination and uti possidetis 
(whether ‘people’ determined the territory, or the territory the people) and in discussions 
over the implications of recognition (whether it was ‘constitutive’ or ‘declaratory’).
III. defining the state
0 e shi!  in legal thought described above from the idea of States existing in a Vattelian 
state of nature between whom a thin architecture of legal relations came to be estab-
lished, to one in which States were understood to exist as legal entities endowed with a 
certain  competences under international law, was one that could be described in terms of 
an increasing concern to identify those ‘marks’ or ‘criteria’ by which statehood could be 
measured. For Vattel, describing or de1 ning the State was primarily a matter of trying to 
capture, in as neutral as possible terms, the plurality of di2 erent kinds of political commu-
nities existing in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century, but for those doing the 
same 100 or 200 years later, the project of description had taken on a di2 erent character.
For a period of time, it wasn’t entirely clear whether what was being described in the proc-
ess was a sociological fact or a legal category (one could construe a de1 nition that merely 
outlined the ‘marks’ of a State in either way), but the terms of description became more 
explicitly exclusionary in nature as time went by. 0 us when Wheaton in 1866 endorsed 
Cicero’s classic de1 nition of the State as ‘a body political, or society of men, united together 
for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety or advantage by their combined strength’ 
he was constrained to point out, at the same time, its limitations. It did not include, as far 
as Wheaton was concerned, corporations created by the State itself, nor ‘voluntary asso-
ciations of robbers or pirates’, nor ‘unsettled horde[s] of wandering savages’, nor indeed 
nations since the State ‘may be composed of di2 erent races of men’ (Wheaton, 1866, s 17). 
0 e de1 nition of the State thus became a vehicle not merely for purposes of description 
(providing an analytical framework for understanding the character of international soci-
ety for purposes of law) but also for distinguishing between those political communities 
that might properly be regarded as subjects of international law and those that would not. 
For some, this shi!  in orientation was decisive. As O’Connell was later to suggest (1970, 
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p 81): ‘the proposition “France is a State” is not a description or a de1 nition but merely a 
conclusion to a train of legal reasoning’.
Yet there was clearly a di3  culty associated with this move from fact to law (or, if you 
prefer, from description to prescription). How, and in what way, might one conceive of 
international law participating in the establishment of territorial political communi-
ties? 0 e title of Crawford’s in8 uential book on the subject—! e Creation of States in 
International Law—would appear to attribute to international law an excessively gran-
diose role. States are surely not ‘created’ by international law in the same sense that a 
cabinet maker might cra!  a piece of furniture; rather they typically emerge through 
spontaneous or organized political action on the part of a community who articulate 
their common destiny in terms of political independence. Indeed, to the extent to which 
there is reliance upon the notion of ‘e2 ectiveness’ for purposes of determining the exist-
ence or otherwise of a State would suggest that the role of law is almost entirely ex post 
facto. ‘Sovereignty’, a! er all, as Wade was to claim seemed to be ‘a political fact for which 
no purely legal authority can be constituted’ (Wade, 1955, p 196). But Crawford was not 
naïve in this sense. What he was arguing against was an exclusively ‘empirical’ notion of 
statehood. A State is not, as he puts it, ‘a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact’ it is rather 
‘a legal status attaching to a certain state of a2 airs by virtue of certain rules or practices’ 
(Crawford, 2006, p 5). A closer analogy therefore might be the idea of the status of ‘crimi-
nality’ being generated through the institutions and structures of the criminal law, or 
of ‘insanity’ through the discipline of psychiatry (Foucault, 2006). Just as ‘a thief ’ is a 
designation appropriate only once it has been determined that the person concerned has 
unlawfully appropriated the property of another, so also to call something a ‘State’ is to 
draw attention to the legal framework within which the powers and competences of a 
State may properly be acquired (Kelsen, 1942).
Whilst this usefully directs our attention both to the relational aspect of statehood and 
the idea that it’s meaning is constituted in a range of ideas about authority and responsibil-
ity, it still doesn’t quite deal with the problem. Crawford’s assumption that the legal order 
accords ‘statehood’ to those entities that possess the requisite characteristics might work 
so far as one may conceive of States emerging through an essentially consensual process. 
0 e emergence of new Republics out of the defunct Soviet Union in the early 1990s, for 
example, posed relatively few problems on this score for the simple reason that Russia had 
e2 ectively renounced, in the Alma Ata Declaration and Minsk Accord,17 any legal interest 
or claims to sovereignty over those regions (Mullerson, 1993). Here, one could conceive 
of the parent State either ‘delegating’ sovereign authority to the nascent regime (much in 
the same way as Czechoslovakia, Poland or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State were ‘created’ 
at the Peace Conferences in the a! ermath of the 1914–18 war), or perhaps as creating the 
necessary legal ‘space’ for the new State to then assert its rights over the territory and 
population concerned.18 By and large, in fact, this has been the predominant means by 
17 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (Minsk Accord), 8 December 1991, 
31 ILM (1992) 143; Alma Ata Declaration, 21 December 1991, ibid, p 148.
18 One may note here, that the answer o! en depends upon the stance adopted in relation to the role of 
recognition. See eg Hall, 1895, p 88: ‘Of course recognition by a parent state, by implying an abandonment of 
all pretensions over the insurgent community, is more conclusive evidence of independence than recogni-
tion by a third power, and it removes all doubt from the minds of other governments as to the propriety of 
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which new States have emerged since 1945 even if many have done so under the rubric of 
‘self-determination’.
Yet it is also evident that in many cases the issue is not one of the consensual devolu-
tion of sovereign authority but of the emergence of a new State out of a condition of dis-
pute or con8 ict. Here the question remains as to how one might conceive of a moment in 
which sovereign authority is created out of the mere fact of the forcible or violent seizure of 
power? In a lecture entitled ‘Force of Law: the Mystical Foundation of Authority’ Jacques 
Derrida (1989–90, p 927) posed the following question:
How are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power and the supposedly 
originary violence that must have established this authority and that could not itself have 
been authorized by any anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal 
nor illegal—or, others would quickly say, neither just nor unjust?
Taking as his starting point, Walter Benjamin’s distinction between ‘constituted’ and 
‘constitutive’ force (between force authorized by law and force that originally establishes 
legal authority) Derrida’s essay was concerned with highlighting how these two ideas 
converged, and to point out the continued presence within all schemes of law and legal 
thought of an originary (extra-legal) violence that necessarily accompanied the estab-
lishment of that legal authority. Of course, even if the authority of an original constitu-
tion can never be thought to depend upon the law which it brings into e2 ect, one might 
nevertheless look to international law for purposes of validating such authority ‘from 
the outside’ so to speak. Yet there are two remaining di3  culties. 0 e 1 rst is that in order 
to sustain the argument that other States may authorize or validate the existence of a 
new State, one would still have to move back to determine the basis upon which those 
authorities claimed that ability. How might existing States bring into existence another 
State with ‘law creating capacity’ without the latter being seen, in some respects, a sub-
ordinate authority? And in that respect the image of an international legal community 
as a closed ‘club’ of European States both territorially incomplete and politically imper-
ial is never far in the background. 0 e second di3  culty is that, as mentioned above, in a 
world already fully demarcated in terms of sovereign jurisdiction (in which there is no 
e2 ective space for the emergence of an entirely new State like that of Liberia in 1847 or 
the Congo Free State in 1885) the process of ‘creation’ can only be achieved by way of 
displacing in some manner or other the prior claims to sovereignty of an existing State. 
Unless existing claims to territorial sovereignty are li! ed or suspended in some way 
(such as by consent), the emergence of a new State could not be achieved without some 
measure of illegality.
Whatever the problems associated with this move from description to prescription, it 
was always evident that if States were to be regarded as actors endowed with personality by 
a superordinating legal order, it was necessary to set out somewhere the terms under which 
this ‘attribution’ of authority might take place and the consequences of it. Strange as it may 
seem, although the United Nations and the League of Nations before it were committed to 
a process of the codi1 cation of international law, they managed to accomplish neither of 
these tasks. In 1949 the International Law Commission did produce a Dra!  Declaration 
recognition by themselves; but it is not a gi!  of independence; it is only an acknowledgement that the claim 
made by the community to have de1 nitively established its independence’.
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on the Rights and Duties of States,19 which went in some direction towards summarizing 
what the implications of Statehood might be, albeit the case that this dra!  was not adopted 
by the General Assembly. Alongside a list of ten duties the Dra!  Declaration included 
four rights: ‘the right to independence and hence to exercise freely, without dictation by 
any other States, all its legal powers, including the choice of its own form of government 
(Article 1), ‘the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over all persons and 
things therein, subject to the immunities recognized by international law’ (Article 2), the 
right to ‘equality in law with every other State’ (Article 5), and the ‘right of individual and 
collective self-defence against armed attack’ (Article 12). Each of these, with some quali-
1 cation, seems to describe those powers possessed only by States to which may be added, 
perhaps, a plenary competence to perform legal acts such as conclude treaties, a right not to 
be subject to compulsory international process or dispute settlement without consent, and 
the bene1 t of a presumption that they enjoy an ‘unlimited freedom’ subject only to those 
constraints determined by law (the ‘Lotus’ principle) (Crawford, 2006, pp 40–41). 0 ese, in 
some respects at least, might suggest why Statehood remains an attractive proposition.
Whilst dra! ing the Declaration, the International Law Commission also brie8 y dis-
cussed the merits of seeking to de1 ne the State for purposes of international law. 0 e gen-
eral reaction, at that time, was that such a project was unnecessary because it was either 
too self-evident or that it was too controversial (the concern being that it would only have 
salience as regards ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ States). In some respects at least, this caution 
was probably informed by the fact that the Pan American Union (the predecessor of the 
Organization of American States) had already dra! ed the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States 1933, Article 1 of which set out a basic de1 nition which, if not 
de1 nitive, could be taken as the starting point for most discussions of territorial status. 
Article 1 provides as follows:
0 e State as a person of international law should possess the following quali1 cations:
a permanent population;(a) 
a de1 ned territory;(b) 
government; and(c) 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.(d) 
For all its signi1 cance Article 1 is still treated with a certain degree of circumspec-
tion. 0 e ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’ seems to be a conclusion 
rather a starting point, and there is no mention of other putatively relevant matters 
such as independence, legitimacy, democracy or self-determination. Precisely what 
Article 1 ‘declares’, furthermore, is a little unclear. As a legal prescription, the terms of 
the Montevideo convention appear to be either too abstract or too strict. 0 ey are too 
abstract in the sense that to say that an entity claiming to be a State needs to be able to 
declare itself as having people, territory and a form of government is really to say very 
little, and certainly does nothing to guide responses to claims by aspirant states such as 
Chechnya, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, or Quebec. Certainly it may exclude 
Wheaton’s private corporation or his nomadic society, but one may ask what else? And 
to what end?
19 GA Res 375(VI), 6 December 1949, Annex.
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What appears to be needed here is one of two things. One possibility is that it requires 
a quantitative measure of intensity: so instead of merely necessitating the existence of a 
 people, a territory and something that describes itself as a government, it requires that these 
qualities are possessed in su3  cient degree. It must be large enough and e2 ective enough to 
warrant being regarded as both self su3  cient and, as the 1 nal quali1 cation suggests, have 
the capacity to enter into relations with other States. Another possibility is that it requires 
some qualitative evaluation—so rather than merely expecting a claim to be made in respect 
of a people or a territory, it expects those claims to be justi1 ed in some way for example on 
the basis that they respond to a principle of self-determination or are capable of substanti-
ation without impinging upon the rights and duties of other sovereign States.
But both of these measures—of intensity and justi1 cation—seem then to demand too 
much. 0 e measure of intensity seems to require the articulation of a ‘threshold’ evalu-
ation the establishment of which would be virtually impossible in the abstract—who could 
say in advance how much territory or how many people are required in order to create a 
State? Surely what would matter is whether it is capable of surviving as an independent 
State, and that, presumably, is something to be determined a! er the fact so to speak. 0 e 
measure of justi1 cation has a similar problem; it seems to rely upon the prior establish-
ment of internationally recognized regimes of entitlement and responsibility (recognized 
claims over territory or in relation to nationals) the validity of which would assume that 
the State as a legal subject is already in existence. In either case, the problem is how one 
moves from fact to law, or from cognition of the existence of a State to its legal recognition 
without, in a sense, assuming that the thing being o2 ered the imprimatur of ‘legality’ is 
not somehow already legally existent.
A. population
As suggested above, one of the critical ideas accompanying the development of the idea 
of the State was that the people were not merely the accidental objects of a sovereign’s 
authority, but that they also partook of that sovereignty and were the immediate object of 
an emergent art of government (for which Lincoln’s phrase ‘government by the people, for 
the people, and of the people’ was an obvious cumulative expression). A population was 
not merely a means of demonstrating the wealth and power of the sovereign, or a means 
by which the State could ultimately secure itself in competition with others (through the 
dra! ing of troops and the cooption of labour for the production of wealth). It also pro-
vided the rationality for government itself: the purpose of government (and hence of the 
State) was, amongst other things, the promotion of the prosperity and happiness of the 
populace.
0 at the State was to have this immanent end was to encourage the idea that, to be 
politically and economically viable, it needed to be of su3  cient size (Hobsbawm, 1992, 
pp 29–39). 0 e smaller, more backward, nationalities as Mill was to aver, were much better 
o2  being absorbed into larger nations, rather than ‘sulk on [their] own rocks . . . cut o2  from 
the general movement of the World’ (Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 
pp 363–364). Uni1 cation thus became the dominant theme of nation-building in the nine-
teeth century and the claims of those such as the Fenians in Ireland or the Bretons in 
France routinely disparaged. 0 is was an idea not entirely shaken o2  in the early part of 
the twentieth century as doubt continued to be expressed as to whether small States such 
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as Luxembourg or Liechtenstein, for example, could properly be regarded as independent 
States. Liechtenstein, indeed, was denied membership of the League of Nations in 1920—
the formal reason for which was its lack of independence from Austria (to whom it had 
‘delegated’ certain customs and postal duties under Agreement). Underlying that, how-
ever, was an evident concern over its size and the political implications of allowing micro-
States the same voting rights as other States in the organs of the League (Duursma, 1996, 
pp 173–174). Later practice in the context of the United Nations, however, has suggested 
that such a consideration is no longer quite what it used to be. Alongside Liechtenstein 
as members of the United Nations (for which, as article 4 of the UN Charter makes clear, 
being a State is a prerequisite) sit States such as Andorra, Monaco, Brunei, Kiribati, Nauru, 
Palau, Vanuatu, and the Marshall Islands, all of which have populations of under 1 mil-
lion. As most conclude, whatever the Montevideo Convention says, there seems to be no 
minimum threshold population necessary in order to obtain statehood.
If the criterion of population seems not to relate to the notion of a threshold, then per-
haps it refers instead to the idea that there must exist a population enjoying exclusive rela-
tions of nationality with the nascent State. Whilst it is certainly true that in the early years 
of the twentieth century nationality did enjoy this aura of exclusivity—and hence, in some 
respects, represented a way of demarcating the populations of di2 erent States—this was 
merely an expectation rather than an obligation. 0 e competence to confer and withhold 
nationality was still regarded as a matter falling within the domain of domestic jurisdic-
tion in the sense that international law neither required such conferral in any particular 
case nor prohibited its withdrawal.20 0 e only context in which international law seemed 
to be relevant was where one state sought to rely upon the bond of nationality when bring-
ing a claim against another State alleging harm to one of its nationals and in which the 
reality of that ‘bond’ was open to dispute.21 Not only did the conferral of nationality thus 
seem to be a competence that ensued from having legal capacity as a State (a consequence, 
that is, not a precondition), but as the toleration of multiple nationality has increased (see 
Franck, 1999, pp 61–75) even the theoretical possibility of it being regarded as an e2 ec-
tive condition for statehood has similarly disappeared. In fact the almost total conceptual 
separation between statehood and the idea of a constitutive population was marked in the 
second opinion of the Badinter Commission in 1992 in which the Commission suggested, 
in the context of the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that one of 
the possible implications of the principle of self-determination was that the individuals 
concerned should have a right to choose their own nationality.22 0 at this o2 ered the pos-
sibility that a majority of the population of a new State might ‘opt’ for the nationality of a 
neighbouring State was treated as largely irrelevant for purposes of determining whether 
the new State met the conditions necessary for its own legal existence. Rather than a con-
dition of statehood, thus, the existence of a ‘population’ seems to be cast in metaphorical 
terms—they must be exist ‘as if ’ in relationship to an order of government over territory, 
in which their presence as objects of coercion is necessary, but their identity as participants 
in that political community remains indeterminate.
20 Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory opinion, 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No 4, p 24.
21 Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Report 1955, p 4.
22 See also, Articles 1 and 11, ILC Dra!  Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States (1999).
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B. territory
Much of the above also applies in relation to the criterion of territory. Just as there appears 
to be no threshold requirement for purposes of population, so also it is hard to discern 
any speci1 c condition concerning possession of su3  cient portions of land. Monaco has 
a territory of less than 1.95 km2 and the Vatican City (a ‘non-member State’ at the UN) 
less than 0.5 km2 (Duursma, 1996, p 117). At the same time, it is clear that the real issue 
in most cases is not the issue of size, nor indeed the mere factual possession or control 
over territory (as, of course, possession may always be ‘adverse’ as in cases of belligerent 
occupation), but rather the ability to rightfully claim the territory as a domain of exclusive 
authority. If, as Arbitrator Huber put it in the Island of Palmas Case, sovereignty signi1 es 
independence, and independence ‘in regard to a portion of the globe . . . the right to exer-
cise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the function of a State’,23 then the existence 
or absence of competing claims to sovereignty would appear to be key.
0 ere is, however, an obvious di3  culty here. If what is required of new States is the 
possession of territory that is otherwise ‘unclaimed’ or ‘undisputed’ then, unless one were 
to be able to identify the territory in question as terra nullius (unoccupied territory),24 or 
territory which has been explicitly or tacitly ‘ceded’ to it, then it remains very di3  cult to 
see how any such nascent State might establish the requisite authority over territory. 0 is 
indeed, seems to be the condition of most secessionist enterprises and the extent cause for 
most to go unful1 lled. Yet the position is not quite as straightforward as this might sug-
gest. It is classically maintained that the absence of clearly delimited boundaries is not a 
prerequisite for statehood. Albania, for example, was admitted to the League of Nations in 
1920 despite the fact that its frontiers had yet to be 1 nally 1 xed, the subsequent delimita-
tion of which came to be the subject of an Advisory Opinion of the PCIJ in the Monastery 
of Saint Naoum case of 1924.25 Re8 ecting upon this practice, the International Court of 
Justice subsequently a3  rmed in the North Sea Continental Shelf case that:
0 e appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise 
delimitation of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to boundaries can a2 ect ter-
ritorial rights. 0 ere is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully 
delimited and de1 ned, and o! en in various places and for long periods they are not . . . 26
Of course, one can rationalize this practice to the extent that one treats the border and the 
territory of the State as two di2 erent things. Borders seem to be the consequence of the 
possession of territory—their delimitation proceeding on the basis that there are legiti-
mate entitlements on either side. Territory, in the context of statehood, however, seems 
incapable of being framed purely in terms of ownership or possession for the simple reason 
that it concerns the prior question as to the very existence of the legal person rather than 
merely its spatial parameters.
0 is distinction between territory and its boundaries is an appealing one in the sense 
that it allows for the disposal of ongoing disputes over the location of borders (o! en by 
23 Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829.
24 For a discussion of this notion in the context of Western Sahara, see Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1975, p 12, paras 79–81.
25 Monastery of Saint-Naoum, Advisory Opinion, 1924, PCIJ, Series B, No 9.
26 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p 3, para 46.
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reference to the classical ‘modes’ by which territory might be acquired such as discovery, 
cession, annexation, occupation or prescription27) without, at the same time, continually 
calling into question the identity of the States whose borders are the subject of dispute. It 
would be almost absurd to argue, for example, that the alteration of the UK’s jurisdiction 
that occurred as a consequence of its assertion of sovereignty over the Island of Rockall 
in 1972 was such as to a2 ect its legal identity and therefore required it to apply afresh for 
membership in the UN or EU. At the same time, it is clear that radical changes to borders 
can have that function—as was demonstrated, in particular, in the case of Yugoslavia/
Serbia (see Blum, 1992). Borders, a! er all, are not merely lines on the ground, or ways 
of delimiting spheres of public jurisdiction, but serve also to delimit the existence of a 
political order by means of its separation from others. 0 e supposition, thus, that a lack 
of delimited borders is of no consequence is hard to maintain. In case of the emergence of 
Israel in 1948, for example, it was not merely the case that some of its borders were in ques-
tion, but the entirety of its territory which had been carved out of the defunct Mandate 
for Palestine. In that context no small signi1 cance can be attributed to the general atmos-
phere of uncertainty generated, amongst other things, by the Security Council’s failure to 
endorse the General Assembly’s plan for partition outlined in Resolution 181(II) of 1947 
and the apparent termination of the Mandate occasioned by the withdrawal of the British 
administration. 0 e lack of an e2 ective interlocutor able to claim that recognition of the 
new State constituted a violation of its own territorial sovereignty (even though there were 
clearly arguments to be made on the part of the Palestinian population generally) was 
such as to allow a critical space for recognition of the State of Israel without the kinds of 
qualms associated with premature recognition that would naturally arise in other con-
texts. Once again, thus, the criterion of territory assumes a highly indeterminate form in 
the legal conception of statehood—it being a simultaneously indispensable quality, but 
yet one incapable of being articulated in anything other than an abstract, and once again 
metaphorical, way.
C. independent government
To a large extent, those addressing the criteria for statehood are uni1 ed on one matter 
above all else: that the criteria are ultimately aimed towards the recognition of ‘e2 ective’ 
governmental entities. Governmental e2 ectiveness understood as its power to assert a 
monopoly over the exercise of legitimate physical violence within a territory (to paraphrase 
Weber, 1994, pp 310–311) is taken to be central.28 In a sense, the Weberian de1 nition is 
somewhat tautological—to say whether an entity enjoys a monopoly over the exercise of 
legitimate violence assumes the prior establishment of a distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate violence (between the violence of the police and that of the insurgent), 
and that kind of distinction as Derrida pointed out was ultimately unavailable. But what is 
clearly meant, here, is that the government concerned must demonstrate unrivalled pos-
session and  control of public power (whatever the speci1 cities of that might be in any 
27 For a classical account of the modes of acquisition of territory see Jennings, 1963.
28 See Lauterpacht, 1947, pp 340–341: ‘0 e principal and probably the only essential condition of recogni-
tion of States and governments is e2 ectiveness of power within the State and of actual independence of other 
States. Other conditions are irrelevant to the true purposes and nature of recognition.’
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particular setting), and that once that unrivalled possession is established with a degree 
of permanence recognition of statehood may follow. 0 is emphasis upon governmental 
e2 ectiveness forms a key part of Crawford’s thesis. Given that ‘nationality is dependent 
upon statehood, not vice versa’ and that territory is de1 ned ‘by reference to the extent of 
governmental power exercised’, ‘there is a good case’ he suggests ‘for regarding govern-
ment as the most important single criterion of statehood, since all the others depend upon 
it’ (Crawford, 2006, p 56).
Crawford’s argument doesn’t stop here though. His purpose is not simply to point out 
that, as the Commission of Jurists maintained in the Aaland Islands case, a new State only 
comes into existence once it is ‘strong enough to assert [itself] throughout the territories of 
the state without the assistance of foreign troops.’29 Rather, it is to suggest that this crite-
rion of e2 ectiveness operates as a legal principle the e2 ect of which is conditioned by other 
relevant principles such as that of self-determination or the prohibition on the use of force. 
He is thus able to maintain that, in some contexts, relatively e2 ective political entities such 
as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Southern Rhodesia have not come to be 
recognized as independent States for the reason that to o2 er such recognition would have 
violated other relevant norms of international law having the status of jus cogens. In the 
same sense, but to di2 erent e2 ect, he also maintains that the criterion of e2 ectiveness is, 
in practice, of relatively less signi1 cance if the State in question is one that enjoys a right 
of self-determination.
Crawford cites, by way of illustration, the case of the Belgian Congo which was granted 
a hurried independence in 1960 as the Republic of the Congo in circumstances in which 
little preparation had been made for independence and in which public order broke down 
shortly a! er (with secessionist factions seeking their own independence in Katanga and 
elsewhere). Belgian troops were reintroduced into the territory under the guise of humani-
tarian intervention and the United Nations responded by establishing ONUC for purposes 
of restoring order whose mission continued until 1964. As Crawford puts it ‘[a]nything less 
like e2 ective government it would be hard to imagine. Yet despite this there can be little 
doubt that in 1960 the Congo was a State in the full sense of the term’ (Crawford, 2006, 
p 57). Its admission to the United Nations for membership had already been approved and 
UN action had been taken on the basis of preserving the ‘sovereign rights of the Republic 
of the Congo’. Crawford suggests ultimately that there were three possible ways of inter-
preting this practice: (i) that the international recognition of the Congo was simply prema-
ture because it did not possess an e2 ective government; (ii) that international recognition 
of the Congo had the e2 ect of creating a State despite the fact that it was not properly 
quali1 ed (ie, that recognition was thereby ‘constitutive’); or (iii) that the requirement of 
‘government’ was, in certain particular contexts, less stringent than might otherwise be 
thought.
Crawford’s clear preference is for the third of these three options and he explains the 
position as follows:
by withdrawing its own administration and conferring independence on local authorities, 
Belgium was precluded from denying the consequences of its own conduct. 0 erea! er there 
was no international person as against whom recognition of the Congo could be unlawful. 
29 LNOJ, Sp Supp 4 (1920) pp 8–9.
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It is to be presumed that a new State granted full and formal independence by a former sov-
ereign has the international right to govern its territory . . . On the other hand, in the seces-
sionary situation the position is di2 erent. A seceding entity seeks statehood by way of an 
adverse claim, and in general statehood can only be obtained by e2 ective and stable exercise 
of governmental powers. (Crawford, 2006, pp 57–58)
It is important to understand the role assigned to the idea of e2 ectiveness here. To begin 
with, it is presented as a general principle of international law—it is not, in that sense, a 
‘law creating fact’ (as might be expressed in the phrase ex factis jus oritur), but simply a 
circumstantial trigger that produces certain legal consequences. E2 ectiveness, further-
more, is not su3  cient on its own: just as some e2 ective entities have not been recognized 
as States (such as Taiwan whose recognition as an independent State has been almost 
permanently deferred as a consequence of the claims made by China over its territory), 
so also other non-e2 ective entities have continued to be regarded as States despite that 
condition (and one may mention here both States under a condition of belligerent occu-
pation such as the Baltic Republics between 1940 and 1990 or Kuwait in 1990–91, and 
States which, like Lebanon and Burma in the 1970s, have experienced extended periods 
of internal  turmoil). E2 ectiveness, in other words, operates as a principle the parameters 
of which are legally determined and may interact with other relevant principles such as 
those of self-determination or the prohibition on the use of force, and those that puta-
tively govern the ‘extinction’ of States.
Yet it is equally clear that the further one goes in seeking to juridify the condition of 
‘e2 ective government’, the more clearly one exposes the inevitable tension between a 
legal principle that seeks to allow the recognition of new aspirant entities once they have 
become legal ‘facts’ so to speak, and one that prohibits any such recognition as being a 
violation of the territorial sovereignty of the State from which that entity is to emerge. In 
the nineteenth century, the criterion of e2 ectiveness was intimately linked with the idea 
of premature recognition. If a third State were to recognize an insurgent movement as an 
independent State before the moment at which it had fully established itself, that recogni-
tion would constitute ‘a wrong done to the parent state’ and, indeed, ‘an act of interven-
tion’ (Hall, 1895, p 89).30 European powers were, thus, very cautious when addressing the 
recognition of the new States in South America, frequently modulating their response 
by reference to what seemed to be happening on the ground. Usually the insurgent com-
munities were initially recognized de facto, de iure recognition coming once it was clear 
that Spain had e2 ectively given up the 1 ght. 0 e importance of e2 ectiveness, in such a 
context, was found in the way in which it served to de1 nitively mark the moment at which 
the rights of the parent State gave way in face of those of the secessionist movement, much 
in the same was as it served to mark the point at which territory was acquired by way of 
annexation or occupation. 0 is also meant that e2 ectiveness was something of a movable 
feast: it never really meant quite the same thing in every place.31 What was required in 
30 In practice, even the intermediary step of recognizing insurgents as belligerents, as Britain and France 
did in relation to the secessionist States in the American Civil War of 1861–5, was frequently treated as an 
unjusti1 ed intervention.
31 Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829 per Huber: ‘Manifestations of territorial sovereignty 
assume . . . di2 erent forms according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sov-
ereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. 0 e intermittence and 
discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily di2 er according as inhabited or 
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order to establish territorial sovereignty depended upon the nature and strength of rival 
claims such that a relatively ine2 ective Congo Free State could garner recognition in 1885 
simply because of the apparent absence of any other recognized sovereign whose rights 
would be impeded in the process, yet considerably more was required for the recognition 
of the new Republics in Latin America. For all the subtle modulations of this early practice, 
however, such arguments clearly became more problematic in the course of the twentieth 
century once it came to be accepted that the use of force was no longer a legitimate means 
of acquiring title to territory.32
If the general prohibition on the use of force implies the illegality of the annexation of 
territory, it is very hard to see how one might legitimate the establishment of a State on 
the territory of another by that means (ex inuria jus non oritur). 0 e now classic case of 
Manchukuo—cited mainly as an exemplar of the doctrine of non-recognition—is per-
haps an example. When Japan engineered the establishment of the State of Manchukuo 
in China in 1931, the Lytton Commission, which had been dispatched by the League of 
Nations on a fact-1 nding mission, concluded that the Japanese action was inconsistent 
with both the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and that Manchukuo itself remained 
largely under Japanese control. Its report underpinned the subsequent articulation of the 
‘Stimson doctrine’ the substance of which a3  rmed the refusal of the United States (and 
those States which followed it) to ‘admit the legality of any situation de facto . . . which 
may impair . . . the sovereignty, the independence, or of the territorial and administrative 
integrity of the Republic of China’ that had been brought about by means contrary to the 
Pact of Paris.33 Several League of Nations resolutions were adopted on this basis calling 
for non-recognition and the ‘State’ was 1 nally dismantled in 1945. More recently than 
this, the establishment of the Turkish Republic in Northern Cyprus following the Turkish 
intervention in 1974 was denied recognition, principally again on the basis that its crea-
tion was the product of an unlawful military intervention.34 Similar arguments were also 
put forward by Bosnia in its memorial in the Genocide Case which maintained that the 
Republica Srpska was not a State in part at least because its creation was associated with a 
violation of the prohibition on the use of force on the part of Serbian forces.35
It is worth noting, in this context, that the prohibition on the use of force has also been 
an idea instrumental not merely in resisting the establishment of puppet regimes, but 
of preserving the formal ‘continuity’ of States during periods of occupation. 0 e Baltic 
Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), for example, were occupied by the Soviet 
Union in 1940 and incorporated within the Union. A good many States refused to rec-
ognize the legality of the incorporation (Ziemele, 2005, pp 22–27) and when in 1990 the 
Supreme Councils of the three Baltic States resolved to ‘re-establish’ their independence 
(which involved the re-invocation of laws pre-dating the occupation and the rejection of 
obligations assumed on their behalf by the Soviet Union) the EC adopted a Declaration 
uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is incontest-
ably displayed or again regions accessible from, for instance, the high seas.’
32 See Article 2(4) UN Charter; Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN, GA Res. 2625(XXV), 
(24 October 1970), Principle 1. See generally Korman, 1996.
33 1 Hackworth 334.
34 See Cyprus v Turkey [GC], no 2571/94, ECHR 2001-IV, 120 ILR 10.
35 Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 April 1994, p 264.
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welcoming ‘the restoration of sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States which 
they had lost in 1940’ and resolving to re-establish diplomatic relations with them.36 0 e 
prohibition on the use of force, in other words, seems to work not only as a way of deny-
ing the recognition of what might otherwise be regarded as e2 ective entities, but as a way 
of keeping alive (as a formal idea at least) States which have been the subject of occupa-
tion and annexation and which are, to all intents and purposes, therefore ‘ine2 ective’. In 
some respects at least, this seems to be unavoidable: one may recall the 1 rst Gulf War of 
1990 was authorized by the Security Council in Resolution 678 (29 November 1990) on 
the basis of seeking to protect and secure the territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of Kuwait the continued existence of which had to be presupposed for purposes of 
authorizing international action despite the fact that its government had been e2 ectively 
displaced by that of Iraq.
If this analysis is accurate, however, it does pose the question as to whether the prin-
ciple of governmental e2 ectiveness has any real meaning other than as a form of his-
torical retrospection. If it is an idea that is systematically displaced by rules relating 
to the use of force or otherwise modulated by the principle of self-determination, its 
signi1 cance as a way of marking out the moment at which a State may be said to have 
come into legal existence seems to have signi1 cantly diminished. On one side, one may 
note an increased willingness to recognize as States (for one reason or another) entities 
that are in some respects ine2 ective—one may recall in recent years for example, that 
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were recognized by the EC as independent States 
in 1992 at a time at which the governments concerned had e2 ective control over only 
a portion of the territory in question (Rich, 1993). On the other side, it is also hard to 
think of many examples of new States being recognized simply because they have man-
aged to secure their independence as a matter of fact. 0 ere are clearly several that have 
not (Katanga, Abkhazia, and the Republika Srpska for example) and for those that seem 
to be plausible cases, some other explanatory framework is usually deployed (such as 
consent, self-determination or disintegration) as a means of displacing the claims of the 
territorial sovereign. 0 e most problematic cases are those of Bangladesh and Eritrea, 
the recognition of which could not easily be framed in terms of the standard under-
standing self-determination. Yet even here, commentators have tended to seek some 
other interpretive framework for explaining such practice: relying, for example, on the 
idea that Eritrea had been unlawfully seized by Ethiopia and that Bangladesh had been 
e2 ectively governed as a non-self-governing territory by Pakistan (a case ‘approximat-
ing’ colonial rule).
0 is tendency towards the promotion of an exclusively ‘juridical’ idea of statehood in 
which questions of e2 ectiveness are routinely subordinated by reference to other legal 
principles has been noted in the work of those such as Jackson and Kreijen. For Jackson 
(1990, pp 21–31), decolonization marked the moment at which the notion of sovereignty 
increasingly took on a negative cast (as implying merely freedom from external inter-
ference as opposed to a positive capacity to act), leading to the recognition of what he 
calls ‘quasi-states’: States which, because of their precipitous independence, were given 
the imprimatur of statehood before developing the necessary internal capacity for pol-
itical self-government and economic independence. Rather than be developed prior to 
36 7/8 Bull EC (1991) 1423.
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independence, such States (mainly those in Africa it seems) have had to develop them-
selves a! er it. A similar stance is adopted by Kreijen who speaks of this change in terms 
of the ‘transformation of the notion of independence from an inherently material con-
cept based on internal sovereignty to a mere formal legal condition primarily depending 
on external recognition’ (Kreijen, 2002, p 92). For Kreijen, this ‘juridi1 cation of state-
hood’ was a situation that demanded ameliorative action such as through the recogni-
tion of a right to development or the reintroduction of the notion of trusteeship into 
international law.
Such re8 ections draw upon themes that are common to recent debates over ‘failed’ or 
‘fragile’ States, the signi1 cance of which goes someway beyond the narrow con1 nes of a 
discussion as to the conditions under which a new State should be recognized, but never-
theless have resonance for an understanding of what the implications of statehood might 
be. In an in8 uential article, Helman and Ratner (1992) commented upon what they saw 
to be a new phenomenon in international relations: the emergence of ‘failed’ or ‘failing 
States’. Failed States were those such as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, and Cambodia in which 
civil con8 ict, government breakdown and economic privation imperilled their own citi-
zens and threatened their neighbours ‘through refugee 8 ows, political instability, and ran-
dom warfare’ (Helman and Ratner, 1992, p 3). 0 e designation of such States as ‘failed’, of 
course, was not simply a neutral exercise in description or diagnosis, but formed a neces-
sary prelude for the adumbration of a series of policy recommendations the central feature 
of which was the proposed introduction of a system of ‘United Nations Conservatorship’ 
along the lines subsequently established in East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo 
for purposes of national, post-con8 ict, reconstruction. Whilst for Helman and Ratner, 
the notion was one that recommended reconstructive activity, in other hands, State fail-
ure has formed the basis for advocacy of a ‘preventive’ system including the imposition of 
sanctions upon such States and their exclusion from membership in international organi-
zations (Rotberg, 2002). In some even, the notion has been employed as the basis for a 
refusal to recognize or implement treaty obligations.37 As Simpson points out, such ideas 
are redolent of those abounding at the end of the nineteenth century in which critical 
di2 erentiations were made between di2 erent kinds of State (such as, between civilized 
and uncivilized States) for purposes of legitimating a range of di2 erent kinds of inter-
vention (Simpson, 2004, pp 240–242) On such a view the re-emergence of this ‘liberal 
anti- pluralist’ theme within international legal doctrine (in which the principles of ter-
ritorial sovereignty and sovereign equality are routinely downplayed or excised) recalls 
the intellectual structures of nineteenth century imperialism (Gordon, 1997). Yet it is also 
run through with many of the same kinds of contradictions. Just as nineteenth century 
international lawyers struggled with the problem of having to both recognize and deny 
the status of political communities in the extra-European world, so also those invoking 
the notion of State failure seem to maintain the idea that these are indeed still States for 
purposes of attributing responsibility for their condition, but yet not entitled to the nor-
mal prerogatives of sovereignty that the intervening States would expect for themselves. 
As Crawford succinctly concludes, ‘[t]o talk of States as “failed” sounds suspiciously like 
blaming the victims’ (Crawford, 2006, p 722).
37 See Yoo, Memorandum, 9 January 2002 explaining that the Geneva Conventions did not apply because 
Afghanistan was a failed State.
08-Evans-Chap08.indd   229 3/16/2010   5:05:50 PM
230 matthew craven
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 16/3/2010, NEWGEN
IV. self-determination
As observed above, one of the key characteristics of the idea of the State as it was to 
emerge in social and political thought from the time of Grotius onwards was that it was 
never solely reducible to the authority of the ruler or government of the time. 0 e State 
embraced, simultaneously, the idea of a nation or a society in relation to which govern-
mental authority was related. It is no accident, thus, that international law acquired the 
designation attributed to it by Bentham—it was always seen as the law between nations 
or societies as much as that between sovereigns, and the term civitas or respublica more 
o! en than not merely denoted the internal relationship between one thing and the other. 
Nevertheless, there were two immanent traditions of thought which informed this rela-
tionship between nation and State as they were to develop—one being what might be 
termed a tradition of civic republicanism that conceived of sovereign authority as being 
a product of relations between individuals existing within the frame of a pre-conceived 
society (exempli1 ed most clearly in the theory of the social contract), the other a ‘com-
munitarian’ tradition that emphasized the corporate character of the society or nation 
the institutional expression of which would be the State (exempli1 ed in Pufendorf ’s 
characterization of the State as a ‘moral person’). In both cases, the ‘nation’ remained an 
important idea—on one side as the social frame within which the contract of sovereignty 
would be formed, on the other side as a natural community endowed with certain innate 
ends and prerogatives (and, indeed, perhaps an independent ‘will’)—but in either case, 
the nation was never entirely reducible to the State itself.
In the course of the nineteenth century these two themes came to be summarized in a 
single verbal expression—that of ‘national self-determination’—but which nevertheless 
merely internalized the two traditions within a single frame. One form of self-determi-
nation, associated with emergent ‘nationalist’ thought in Germany and Italy (sustained in 
the work of Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini amongst others), conceived of the idea that nation 
and State should be made congruent. It was the perfection of national society (understood 
variously as a society determined by reference to racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic or 
historic homogeneity) that was to be sought in the promotion of its self-determination. 
Another form of self-determination, associated with the tradition of civic republicanism 
(with roots in the work of those such as Kant), conceived of the idea of self-determination 
in terms of representative self-governance: it being the promotion of individual liberty 
through the technique of self-rule that was to be sought. Here, as Mill was to suggest, the 
frame of the ‘nation’ remained important if only because social uniformity and national 
homogeneity were necessary productive conditions for self-governance.38 0 ese two con-
cepts of self-determination presented very di2 erent challenges to the existing order of 
sovereign States—the 1 rst as an ‘external’ challenge to the spatial ordering of a dynastic 
European society and its failure to map itself congruously with the geography of ‘nations’ 
as they were to perceive themselves; the second presenting a challenge to the authority of 
governments to represent externally the will of a people to whom they were not internally 
38 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Chapter XVI: ‘it is in general a necessary con-
dition of the institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of 
nationalities’.
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responsible. 0 ese were not identical claims by any means: the latter appeared to confront 
the sovereign’s authority with a criterion of legitimacy founded upon a rationalistic con-
ception of representation, whereas the former appeared to challenge authority (even rep-
resentative authority) with a claim to power based upon group identity (Berman, 1987–88, 
p 58). In either sense, however, national self-determination was clearly the language of 
change and reform (see Cobban, 1945).
It was in the reconstruction of Europe in the a! ermath of the 1914–18 War, however, 
that the principle of national self-determination was to obtain its most concrete institu-
tional expression. 0 e agenda had been set by President Wilson in his speech to Congress 
in 1918 in which he famously set out the ‘Fourteen Points’ which he believed should inform 
the peace process. None of these points referred explicitly to the principle of national self-
determination, but it was nevertheless made clear that boundaries in the new Europe 
should be con1 gured so far as possible by reference to ‘historically established’ relations 
of nationality and allegiance. 0 e Polish State was resurrected, Czechoslovakia and a 
Serb-Croat-Slovene State created out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and vari-
ous other border adjustments made with provision for plebiscites in various locations. 
In many respects, however, it was an imperfect plan. On the one hand, it was always evi-
dent that the task of aligning political boundaries around the various ‘nations’ of Europe 
would be impossible, not simply because of the di3  culties of determining which ‘nation’ 
deserved a State, but also because of their dispersed character. 0 is recommended two 
expedients—one being the forcible transfer of certain populations (such as between 
Greece and Turkey39), the other being the institution of minority agreements within the 
Peace Treaties in order to protect those residual national communities cut adri!  from the 
‘kin State’ to which they were naturally thought to belong (Claude, 1955, pp 12–30). On 
the other hand, it was also evident that the Wilsonian project of self-determination was 
destined to be geographically limited—national self-determination was not something 
that was envisaged as being applicable in relation to the victorious powers themselves (eg 
for the Flemish, Irish, or Basques), nor was it regarded as applicable to territories outside 
Europe which, in the terms of the time, had yet to discover their national consciousness 
(Hobsbawm, 1992, pp 131–141).
If national self-determination was merely the implicit premise behind the reorganiza-
tion of Europe a! er the First World War, it became a very much more explicit part of the 
settlement a! er the Second World War, but in some ways on quite di2 erent terms. 0 e 
UN Charter identi1 ed respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples as being one of the purposes of the Organization (Article 1), Chapter XI of which 
made clear that the primary concern was to foster self-government, development and the 
political, economic, social and educational advancement of those peoples which had ‘not 
yet attained a full measure of self-government’. 0 at this was to be interpreted as meaning 
‘decolonization’ was later made clear by the General Assembly in a series of Resolutions 
beginning with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories 
of 1960.40 Over the course of the next 30 years most of those territories identi1 ed as ‘non-
self-governing’ by the United Nations were to acquire their independence and become, as 
an important marker of their new status, members of the Organization.
39 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Lausanne, January 30, 1923.
40 GA Res 1514 (14 December 1960). See also GA Res 1541 (15 December 1960).
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Whilst decolonization was obviously to transform the membership of the UN, and 
 radically re-shape the character and nature of its activities, its implications as an instance 
of the application of the principle of self-determination were somewhat less clear. In one 
direction, of course, it posed the question whether self-determination was a principle 
applicable only the context of decolonization, or whether it might also legitimate seces-
sion in other cases. UN practice seemed limited in that sense (Bangladesh remaining a 
problematic exception), but limited in a way that seemed to speak of pragmatism rather 
than principle. If what was in contemplation was the ‘self-determination of ‘all peoples’ as 
Article 1(1) of the two UN Covenants on Human Rights a3  rmed,41 then on what grounds 
might one want to restrict it only to those overseas territories that formed part of the 
maritime Empires of European States? Was it only in that context that one could speak of 
peoples being non-self-governing or subject to oppression or alien rule? But of course the 
practice was not one of ‘national’ self-determination in the sense that President Wilson 
had understood it at all. It was self-determination for those ‘selves’ that had been spe-
ci1 cally designated as being entitled to determine their own political future through the 
plebiscite and ballot box. It did not extend to those other, self-selecting communities, such 
as the Ibo in Biafra or the Katangese in the Congo who demanded independence on their 
own initiative and whose claims to independence largely fell on deaf ears.
It was soon to become apparent that the primary means for this process of designation, 
or prior determination, was worked out through the medium of colonial administration. 
In some instances, the external boundaries of the colony de1 ned the presumptive unit 
of self-determination—as, for example, in the case of Ghana or the Belgian Congo. In 
other cases, it was determined by reference to the internal boundaries that demarcated the 
di2 erent administrative units of a single colonial power (such as the boundary between 
Uganda and Tanganyika). 0 e principle, in this second case, came to be expressed in the 
phrase uti possidetis—which referred to a concept having its origins in the somewhat hazy 
practice of boundary delimitation in South America, but which subsequently came to be 
a3  rmed as ‘a general principle . . . logically connected with the phenomenon of obtain-
ing independence, wherever it occurs’42 (see generally Shaw, 1986). Precisely what ‘logic’ 
strictly required obeisance to the inherited parameters of colonial administration was not 
clear, but there did at least seem to be a need to determine who the people were before they 
were asked to decide upon their political future.
All of this, however, seems to be a long way away from the radical notion of self-de-
termination as an idea which, as Berman puts it, challenges legal thought ‘by posing the 
problem of law’s relationship to sources of normative authority lying beyond the normal 
rules of a functioning legal system’ (Berman, 1988–89, p 56). 0 e more the principle could 
be described in terms of a prosaic institutional practice, or as a pragmatic obeisance to the 
determined character of existing boundaries, the less dangerous (and indeed less emanci-
patory) it seemed. Yet, fundamentally, there was still an inevitable tension between, on the 
one hand, the lo! y proclamation of self-determination with its open-ended demand for 
self-government, and the simultaneous commitment to the principle of territorial integ-
rity (which was almost invariably mentioned in General Assembly resolutions in the same 
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 1(1); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 1(1).
42 Frontier Dispute, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 554, para 20.
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breath as that of self-determination). Of course, preserving intact all external and internal 
administrative boundaries nodded in the direction of this idea of territorial integrity, and 
certainly served to secure the political integrity of the newly emergent States once they 
had become established. It is no great surprise, in that sense, that the member States of 
the Organization of African Unity pledged in Resolution 16(1) of 1964 to respect colonial 
frontiers as they existed at the moment of independence (Shaw, 1996, pp 97–105). But at 
the same time, it still evaded the larger question as to how, and on what basis, the colo-
nies may have enjoyed a right of self-determination, rather than the di2 erent peoples that 
comprised those colonies or, as Belgium cynically insisted, other non-self-governing com-
munities elsewhere in the world. Part of the answer must be found in the gradual priori-
tization during this period of the idea of self-determination as a principle associated with 
the republican notion of self-governance rather than as a vehicle for aligning the bounda-
ries of the polis with that of the nation. In one direction, for example, one may note that 
the principle of self-determination had, by this stage, lost its pre1 x; ‘peoples’ had replaced 
‘nations’ as the relevant subjects of the right, and the identi1 cation of a community as 
ethnically or linguistically homogenous increasingly became a marker of its status as a 
minority rather than as a people entitled to political independence. In another direction, 
this new alignment was also evident in the increased emphasis placed upon the intrinsic 
relationship between ‘internal’ self-determination and the protection of individual and 
collective human rights (Cassese, 1995, pp 101–140; McCorquodale, 1994).
Nevertheless, this still only answers half of the question: it may explain, for example, 
why self-determination took the shape it did, and why it was a right denied to other ‘minor-
ity’ communities, but still doesn’t answer how it was that decolonization could be squared 
with the principle of territorial integrity. For some colonial powers, a! er all, the colony 
was still largely regarded as part of the Metropolitan State (very much more so for Portugal 
and France than for Britain) the separation of which necessarily implied some diminution 
of the sovereign claims of the colonial powers. 0 e right of self-determination, further-
more, seemed to speak of a process of determining future status, rather than a status in its 
own right. 0 is, as Berman was puts it, posed the question as to how international law was 
able to ‘recognize a right accruing to an entity which, by its own admission, lacks inter-
national legal existence?’ (Berman, 1988–89, p 52). 0 e answer to both questions seemed 
to be that self-determination had a suspensive capacity the e2 ect of which was to displace 
claims to sovereignty on the part of the parent State, and a3  rm, somewhat obscurely, the 
nascent claims to sovereignty on the part of the people whose future had yet to be deter-
mined. 0 ere was, in fact, a model for this idea already in place and which had already 
informed some of the practice of the ICJ in its deliberations on the question of sovereignty 
in case of Protectorates (such as Morocco)43 and Mandate territories. In the latter con-
text, as McNair was to suggest, the question of sovereignty seemed to lie in ‘abeyance’.44 
0 e rights of the colonial power were not those of a sovereign, but rather those enjoyed in 
virtue of agreement, to be exercised by way of sacred trust. Independence thus in no way 
implied a loss of sovereignty, or a violation of the principle of territorial integrity, rather 
43 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1952, p 176 at 
p 188 where, despite the French Protectorate, Morocco was declared to be ‘a sovereign State’.
44 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p 128, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Mc Nair, p 150.
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the fruition of a status temporarily subordinated by the fact of colonial administration. In 
that respect, the most remarkable feature of process of decolonization was the generalized, 
and quasi-legislative, statement found in the General Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly 
Relations45 which declared that ‘the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing terri-
tory has, under the Charter of the United Nations, a status separate and distinct from the 
territory of the State administering it’. In virtue of this, any apparent tension that existed 
between its espousal of the principle of self-determination and simultaneous rea3  rmation 
of the principle of territorial integrity largely evaporated.
If the principle of self-determination seemed to imply a suspension of claims to sov-
ereignty on the part of the Metropolitan State and a commitment to the positive promo-
tion of self-government on the part of ‘dependent’ peoples, it also seemed to imply the 
non-recognition of attempts to subvert that process. 0 us, for example, when a minority 
white regime in what was then Southern Rhodesia declared its independence from Britain 
in 1965 its unilateral declaration of independence was immediately condemned by both 
the UN General Assembly46 and the Security Council which called upon States not to 
recognize the ‘illegal racist minority regime’, and provided for a regime of sanctions to 
be imposed.47 Similarly, but in a di2 erent context, when the South African government, 
in pursuit of its policy of apartheid, established the Bantusans of Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, 
and Bophuthatswana in the years 1976–1981 under the pretext that this constituted an 
implementation of the principle of ‘self-government’, those claims were again rejected 
with the General Assembly and Security Council condemning their establishment and 
calling for non-recognition.48 Only in cases in which the subversion of self-determination 
came at the hands of another ‘newly independent State’ (Goa, West Irian, East Timor, and 
Western Sahara) was the reaction somewhat more muted or equivocal, and one may sense 
that this was probably informed by the idea that the rubric of colonialism had somewhat 
less purchase in such cases.
Yet, for all its continuing associations with the process of decolonization, the story of 
self-determination does not end there. A! er the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 
collapse of the Soviet rule, the principle of national self-determination was once again to 
acquire a prominence in international legal thought and practice. Of the new States that 
were to emerge in the 1990s, most did so on a platform of national self-determination, 
most also held plebiscites or national polls by way of authorization, some also sought to 
make as a determinant of subsequent citizenship a facility with the national language 
(Cassese, 1995, pp 257–277). Not all such cases, however, posed problems as far as the 
question of statehood was concerned. In some cases the change could be conceived as 
little more than a change of government (Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, 
and Bulgaria for example), in some as the emergence from a condition of unlawful annex-
ation (the Baltic Republics), in some as a basis for consensual re-uni1 cation (Germany), 
or of separation (the Czech and Slovak Republics). In the cases of the former USSR and 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, the role to be played by the principle of 
self- determination was to assume considerably more signi1 cance.
45 GA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970).
46 GA Res 2379 (SSVI) (28 October 1968).
47 SC Res 232 (16 December 1966); SC Res 253 (29 May 1968).
48 GA Res 31/6A (26 October 1976); SC Res 402 (22 December 1976).
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In the case of the Soviet Union, the problem was e2 ectively resolved at two meetings 
in Minsk and Alma Ata (see above) which, whilst by no means wholly consistently, put 
in place the idea that the independence of the new Republics in Central Asia and else-
where had come about through the consensual secession of the administrative units of 
the Union leaving Russia as the rump State. If the language of national self-determination 
was relevant, here, it was not such as to challenge or disrupt the principle of sovereignty or 
 territorial integrity in any profound way. 0 e case of Yugoslavia, by contrast, was far more 
di3  cult (see Radan, 2002). Prior to 1989, Yugoslavia had been a Federal State compris-
ing of six Republics representing the major ‘nationalities’ and two autonomous enclaves 
(Kosovo and Vojdvodina) each of which had representation in the administration of the 
Federation. 0 e death of President Tito in 1980 was followed by a power-struggle within 
the Federation culminating in declarations of independence being announced on the 
part of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 recalling, in their terms, the principle of national 
self-determination (which itself had some recognition in the Federal Constitution). 0 ese 
initiatives, however, were forcibly resisted and the subsequent outbreak of violence was 
then to engulf Bosnia-Herzegovina, the severity of which led ultimately to the dispatch 
of peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR), the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the later submission of claims of genocide to the 
International Court of Justice.
One of the key questions here for other European States was whether or not to rec-
ognize the Statehood of the entities emerging from the con8 ict. Doing so had several 
important implications as regards the characterization of the ongoing con8 ict (as inter-
national rather than merely internal (see Gray, 1996)) and as to the justi1 cation for the 
arms embargo. It also, and more signi1 cantly for present purposes, would seem to bring 
into play the possibility that there might exist a ‘post-colonial’ right of secessionary self-
determination, the implications of which would extend far beyond the con1 nes of the 
con8 ict itself. Sensing that there were a number of delicate issues involved, the States 
participating in the Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991 established what became known as 
the ‘Badinter Commission’ (so named, a! er its Chairman Robert Badinter, President of 
the French Constitutional Court) to provide advice on the legal issues arising (see Craven, 
1995; Terrett, 2000). In the Autumn of 1991 the Badinter Commission issued two sig-
ni1 cant Opinions that set the stage for the subsequent recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and, somewhat later, that of Macedonia. 0 e key advice given by 
the Badinter Commission, having speci1 cally been asked about the implications of the 
principle of self-determination, was to declare that the former SFRY was ‘in the process of 
disintegration’ on the basis that the Federal organs could no longer wield e2 ective power 
(it being hinted that those Federal organs such as the Yugoslav National Army that con-
tinued to operate had been e2 ectively co-opted by the Serbian government). 0 e signi1 -
cance of this should not be lost. What the Commission signally refused to say was that the 
‘nationalities’ within the federation had a right of secessionary self-determination. 0 ey 
could plausibly have linked such a claim to the provisions of the Constitution that spoke 
of self-determination, to the emerging idea that self-determination is legitimate in cases 
of abusive or totalitarian exercises of power, or indeed, more simply to the proclamations 
of independence on the part of the various Republics. Doing the latter would obviously 
have been a little awkward given the claims to independence on the part of the Serbian 
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 community in Bosnia,49 but its general reluctance here, no doubt, was informed by the 
sense that the recrudescent ethnic nationalism that underpinned the claims to independ-
ence were a throwback to a pre-modern primitivism the function of which had merely 
been to exacerbate the con8 ict in the 1 rst place. Caught thus in a position of neither 
wanting to ally itself with the Milosevic regime whose campaign of violence had been 
pursued under the banner of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (in 
whose name the government of Serbia and Montenegro continued to act), nor wanting 
to provide continuing justi1 cation for inter-ethnic violence in the name of national self-
determination, the Commission’s determination that the Federation was in the process 
of dissolution was an extraordinarily dextrous act. Its e2 ect was to provide a necessary 
analytical space for the recognition of the emergent Republics (whether or not on the 
basis of the principle of self-determination50) without running the risk of undermining 
respect for the principle of territorial integrity. Indeed, on the latter score, the Badinter 
Commission rea3  rmed, in its second Opinion, the principle of uti possidetis, making 
clear in the process that the entities emerging from the former Yugoslavia were to be 
those that already had enjoyed administrative recognition within the Federation. 0 at 
this was always to leave a certain ambiguity as to the status of Kosovo, which of course 
had a degree of administrative independence within the Federal structure albeit not as a 
constitutive nationality, and perhaps goes some way to explain the ease by which the UN 
administration over the territory was established (the question always being in the air as 
to whether this was, indeed, ‘Serbian’ territory). Nevertheless, what appears from this, yet 
again, is the idea that the principle of self-determination is not something that rubs dir-
ectly against the grain of statehood, nor that it necessarily stands in competition with the 
principle of territorial integrity. Rather it is an idea that has been allowed to 8 ourish in the 
interstices of the existing order, occupying those spaces which have been opened up for it 
through the prior displacement of arguments about territorial sovereignty—whether that 
be through the idea that colonial territories had a status distinct from that of the metro-
politan States, that independence was ‘granted’ rather than acquired, or that con8 ict had 
led to the dissolution of State from which the republics were to emerge.
V. democracy and human rights
For all the normalizing characteristics of much of this practice, there has remained 
a stand in much international legal thought that has resisted the implication that self-
 determination is nothing other than a process of describing how new States emerge. If 
‘national’ self-determination understood in its ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic 
sense has been carefully avoided (or perhaps subsumed within the discourse of minority 
rights), self-determination in its civic republican sense has not. Indeed events in the 1990s 
have, if nothing else, given considerable impetus to the idea that there exists an emerging 
right to democratic governance in international law (Franck, 1996; Fox and Roth, 2000) the 
49 In Opinion No 2, the Commission addressed the claim to self-determination on the part of the Serbs 
in Bosnia and decided that, as a minority, they were not entitled to independence. It did suggest, however, 
that self-determination might be reinterpreted as implying a right of each individual to the nationality of 
their choice.
50 See on this Koskenniemi, 1994a.
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source of which is o! en traced to the linkage between the principle of self- determination 
and the individual rights of political participation (Article 25 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights) and evidenced in the emerging practice of multilateral election 
monitoring and other initiatives designed to promote democracy and human rights. At 
1 rst glance of course, the idea of a right to democratic governance has little obvious reson-
ance for questions of statehood. Since it is concerned primarily with the issue of govern-
mental rather than State legitimacy it may thus be thought to have salience in relation to a 
range of discretionary relations (diplomatic, 1 nancial and trade relations for example), but 
not so in relation to the qualities of statehood itself. Yet it is clear that those advocates of the 
‘emerging’ right to democratic government do not see it as so con1 ned.
0 ere are two plausible ways in which a concern for democracy and human rights may 
impinge upon the question of statehood: one as an additional ‘condition’ that needs to be 
met before independence may be recognized (one of the earliest examples being Fawcett’s 
interpretation of the Southern Rhodesian crisis in 1965 (Fawcett, 1965–66)); the other 
as a basis for the exercise of self-determination on the part of a community su2 ering 
oppression or systematically excluded from access to government. In respect of the 1 rst 
issue, as Murphy points out, elements of recent State practice seem to point towards a 
development in that direction. Shortly a! er the beginning of the con8 ict in Yugoslavia 
in 1991 the EC member States convened at an extraordinary EPC ministerial meeting to 
adopt a common policy on the recognition of States emerging from the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. In the guidelines they were to produce, they a3  rmed ‘their readiness to rec-
ognise, subject to the normal standards of international practice and political realities in 
each case, those new states which . . . have constituted themselves on a democratic basis’.51 
Further to this, they set out several conditions including: (1) respect for the provisions 
of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act ‘especially with regard to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights’; (2) to guarantee the rights of ethnic and national groups 
and minorities; (3) to respect the inviolability of existing borders; (4) to accept all relevant 
arms control commitments; and (5) to commit to settle all questions of State succession 
and regional disputes by agreement. Whilst clearly evidence of a potential shi!  in prac-
tice, these guidelines were nevertheless very loosely applied in the subsequent process by 
which the EC member States came to recognize the new Yugoslav Republics. 0 e recogni-
tion of Croatia proceeded in early 1992 despite the fact that the Badinter Commission had 
found that it had not fully complied with the relevant conditions, whereas the recognition 
of Macedonia was held up as a consequence of an ongoing dispute with Greece over its 
name. 0 e guidelines, it seems, were simply what they declared themselves to be: merely 
guidelines. Commentators were thus doubtful as to whether such criteria had yet been 
de1 nitively established (Murphy, 2000, p 139) even if there was considerable enthusiasm 
for the idea that the new States acquiring their independence would remain bound by all 
pre-existent human rights treaty commitments that were formally applicable to that ter-
ritory (Kamminga, 1996; Craven, 2007, pp 244–256).
To some extent, however, this idea has been given a further lease of life in the form 
of the recent regimes for international territorial administration (East Timor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Kosovo) put in place, amongst other things, for purposes of securing the 
51 Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union’ (1992) 31 ILM 1486.
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rule of law and the protection of human rights (Wilde, 2008). As some have argued, such 
regimes have seemed to function as institutional precursors to independence in such a way 
as to be evidence of a new emerging doctrine of ‘earned sovereignty’—‘earned’ in the sense 
that independence will o! en be phased, conditional and perhaps constrained (Williams, 
Scharf, and Hooper, 2002–3). On the face of it, such arguments seem to promote a radical 
revision of the standard approach to statehood—forefronting the requirement of compli-
ance with human rights and democratic conditions, and relativizing the notion of sover-
eignty. Yet, whatever the intrinsic merits of such an agenda, and however far this may be 
thought to open out a new realm of policy alternatives, it is hard to shake o2  the sense that 
this is anything other than a highly selective reinstitution, under UN auspices, of the old 
Mandate/Trusteeship arrangement in which territories were ‘prepared’ for independence 
under the tutelage of colonial masters.
Just as there might be hesitancy about the role that considerations of democracy and 
human rights might play in the recognition of new States, so also there is equivocation 
over the extent to which those considerations might serve as a basis for legitimating seces-
sion. In its advisory opinion concerning the secessionist claims of Quebec, the Canadian 
Supreme Court summarized what it saw to be the contemporary position:
the international law right to self-determination [gives rise to] . . . a right to external self-
determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example 
under foreign military occupation; or where a de1 nable group is denied meaningful 
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural develop-
ment. In all three situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-
 determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to 
self-determination.52
Since Quebec ‘did not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people’ 
and since the Quebecers had not been denied ‘meaningful access to government’ the 
Court concluded that they did not enjoy the right to e2 ect the secession of Quebec from 
Canada unilaterally. Rather, they enjoyed a (Constitutional) right to negotiate the terms 
of a separation.
0 e most interesting feature of this opinion, however, was the attempt by the Court 
to run a thread through the three instances of secessionary self-determination outlined 
in its Opinion by linking each one to a violation of ‘internal self-determination’. 0 ere 
are two ideas in play here: one is a three-fold association being forged between the fact of 
alien rule, the denial of human rights (oppression) and the lack of access to government, 
each of which is taken as expressive of the same denial of self-determination. 0 e other, 
associated, idea is one that e2 ectively makes conditional any claim to sovereignty (or 
territorial integrity) upon the preservation and promotion of individual and collective 
rights and the maintenance of a system of government by consent. One might conclude 
from this that in cases where a determinate people have been oppressed, abused, or rou-
tinely denied their rights (treated, in some respects, as a non-self-governing territory), 
a claim for secessionary self-determination might be sustained simply by reason of the 
fact that the parent state is no longer in the position of being able to justify its claim to 
52 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, Canadian Supreme Court (1998) 37 ILM 1340, para 138.
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sovereignty. 0 is ‘remedial’ notion of self-determination, on some accounts at least, goes 
some way to explain practice in the case of Eritrea, Bangladesh, and perhaps even Kosovo 
(Crawford, 2006, p 126).
In the case of Kosovo, one may certainly appreciate that, in some instances, recogni-
tion of its independence has been explicitly linked to the violence and abuse directed 
against the Kosovo Albanian population prior to the establishment of UNMIK, and to 
the consequential impossibility of it being ‘returned’ to Serbia. Yet one may also note 
that many other of the recognizing States (of which there are 62) were deeply equivocal 
on this score, making great play of the sui generis character of the situation, the ‘suspen-
sory’ character of SC Resolution 1244 (1999) which authorized the establishment of an 
international civil administration in the territory, and the ‘special role’ played by the UN 
Special Envoy within the political process that had culminated in the development of 
the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan). 0 e 
apparently exceptional character of the position of Kosovo had two obvious implications. 
0 e 1 rst was that it spoke of a determination to make clear that, whatever the outcome, 
the case of Kosovo should not set any kind of precedent for other aspirant communities. 
Far from reinforcing, therefore, the idea of a right to remedial secession, it appears to do 
the opposite. 0 e second implication is that the asserted non-exemplary character of the 
Kosovan situation was such as to allow recognition to proceed unimpeded. Its appar-
ent ‘uniqueness’ made it perfectly feasible for recognizing States to take a completely 
independent view on the matter, attuning their policies not to generic concerns about 
sovereignty or territorial integrity, but to an appreciation as to what might seem politi-
cally viable.
Needless to say, it is evident that the kind of reasoning that tends to underpin this idea 
of remedial secession is not con1 ned to that particular discourse. Precisely the same struc-
ture of argument is to be found in the debates over humanitarian intervention (and, more 
recently, the Responsibility to Protect53). In the view of those such as Reisman, for example, 
the abusive, totalitarian government is one that should no longer be allowed to enjoy the 
privilege of sovereignty as a defence against external intervention. Sovereignty, for him, 
is a relic of an absolutist past that has been profoundly recon1 gured by the emergent law 
of human rights. And recent State practice—such as that exempli1 ed in the interventions 
in Haiti (1994), Panama (1989), and Sierra Leone (1997)—were evidence of a bene1 cial 
shi!  in thought and practice (Reisman, 1990). Others, following this theme, have been 
cautious of its unilateralist bent, recommending in contrast, collective intervention under 
auspices of the United Nations in such circumstances (Franck, 2000). Yet for all the well-
intentioned bravura associated with such ‘muscular humanitarianism’ (Orford, 2003), it 
poses all too many questions regarding the opacity of the conditions warranting interven-
tion, the selective character of practice that underpins it and, if nothing else, its evidently 
imperial (and gendered) overtones. One may recall, a! er all, that the nineteenth century 
Scramble for Africa was justi1 ed, in part at least, upon the basis that it was necessary in 
order to combat the slave trade—a claim that was almost immediately shown to be the 
merest 1 gment given the subsequent violence that accompanied colonial rule in the Congo 
Free State and South West Africa.
53 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA doc. A/60/L.1, (2005) paras 138–139. See also Ch 17 below.
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VI. statehood and recognition
As has been suggested above, a key feature of the development of international law at 
the end of the nineteenth century was a certain critical ambivalence as to the process 
by which new states might come to acquire rights and obligations under international 
law. 0 e Vattelian image of States existing in a state of nature in their relations with one 
another, subject only to such obligations as might have been voluntary accepted (through 
treaty or adherence to custom) seemed to place States in some respect prior to law. 0 is, 
of course, had some enduring resonance: international law itself did not create States by 
way of some legislative 1 at, rather they emerged through the spontaneous and concerted 
action of a community or society organizing itself internally as a sovereign political com-
munity. International law merely had a role in acknowledging the reality of something 
which already been put in place. A State ‘is a State’, as Wheaton put it, simply ‘because it 
exists’ (Wheaton, 1866, p 28).
In so far as the society of States remained entirely stable this might have su3  ced, yet by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century the emergence of new States in South America 
and the establishment of Belgium and Greece within Europe, brought to prominence the 
practice of recognition, which had previously been employed largely for purposes of iden-
tifying a condition of belligerency or insurgency. 0 is immediately posed a question as to 
the relationship between that practice of diplomatic recognition and the general status of 
the communities being thereby recognized. Even if the existence of States was merely a 
question of fact, their claims to sovereignty o! en had to be judged by reference to the com-
peting claims of other States. In case of secession, for example, it was understood that to 
recognize a new State before the moment at which it had fully established its independence 
was not merely to o2 end the sensibilities of the State attempting to suppress the  rebellion, 
but also constituted an act of unlawful intervention. 0 is was to subtly change, even if 
not to radically transform, the initial hypothesis. One could still think of the existence of 
States primarily in terms of their internal e2 ectiveness, but the function of recognition 
came to determine the question of participation or membership in the wider international 
community. Wheaton (1866, s 21, p 28) thus distinguished between internal and external 
sovereignty for such purposes:
So long, indeed, as the new State con1 nes its action to its own citizens, and to the limits of 
its own territory, it may well dispense with such recognition. But if it desires to enter into 
that great society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights to which they are 
mutually entitled, and duties which they may be called upon reciprocally to ful1 l, such rec-
ognition becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation of the new State in all 
the advantages of this society.
What this immediately put on the table was a distinction between the existence of States 
on the one hand, and their participation in the international community on the other. 
Questions of status and relations thus seemed separable: diplomatic recognition being rel-
evant to the latter not the former. Of course, this only really made sense in a context in 
which international law was understood as occupying a speci1 c geographical space. 0 e 
hypothesis that there might be States possessing ‘internal sovereignty’ yet not participat-
ing in the ‘great society of nations’ had its concrete expression in the postulated divide 
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between the European and non-European worlds at the time. 0 is was precisely the way 
in which one could rationalize, in some degree at least, knowledge of the existence of the 
Ottoman Empire, China, and Japan as independent political communities yet not assume 
they were, as a consequence, subjects of international law in the fullest sense.
Nevertheless, the division between internal and external sovereignty, or between the 
existence of States and their participation in the international community was cause for 
a certain amount of ambivalence. To begin with, there were two possible constructions of 
the position. One was that the State existed for legal purposes from the moment of its exist-
ence de facto, and that recognition and ‘participation’ were merely complementary  bene1 ts 
(see eg He;  er, 1857, p 43). Another was that its existence for purposes of international law 
was determined by the moment of participation since it was only through recognition 
that legal relations with other members of the international community would be de1 ni-
tively established.54 In some respects it seemed to be necessary to maintain both of these 
 positions. On the one hand, in order for the society of nations to have determinate content, 
there needed to be a proximate relation between the subjects of law and the boundaries of 
that society understood as a legal order. On the other hand, it seemed equally necessary to 
admit the legal existence of unrecognized States in order to give legal e2 ect to treaty rela-
tions with non-European States and societies. Colonization of the non-European world 
thus depended upon a simultaneous process of exclusion and inclusion: the native sov-
ereign being excluded from the European legal order in order to justify the claims of the 
latter to be a society of civilized sovereigns, yet simultaneously included within the legal 
order in order to rationalize the treaty relations upon which colonization depended. 0 e 
maintenance of an ambivalent relationship between recognition and statehood was the 
means by which that could be achieved.
Although by the beginning of the twentieth century, the project of ‘land appropriation’ 
in Africa had largely run its course, international lawyers were no clearer as to the nature 
or character of the process of recognition. In a remarkably obtuse passage Hall (1895, p 87) 
summarizes the position as follows:
0 eoretically a politically organized community enters of right . . . into the family of states 
and must be treated in accordance with law, so soon as it is able to show that it possesses the 
marks of a state. 0 e commencement of a state dates nevertheless from its recognition by 
other powers; that is to say from the time at which they accredit ministers to it, or conclude 
treaties with it, or in some other way enter into such relations with it as exist between states 
alone. For though no state has a right to withhold recognition when it has been earned, states 
must be allowed to judge for themselves whether a community claiming to be recognised 
does really possess all the necessary marks, and especially whether it is likely to live. 0 us 
although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition is the 
necessary evidence that the right has been acquired.
Whilst overtly assuming what was to become known as a ‘declaratory’ approach to recog-
nition (the essence of which insists that a state exists as a subject of international law at the 
54 Wheaton, 1866, s 21: ‘until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other States, the new 
State becomes entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those States only by whom that sover-
eignty has been recognized’; Lorimer, 1883, p 106: ‘0 ough recognition is o! en spoken of as admission into 
the family of nations, it leaves the State which has claimed and obtained it from one State only, in the same 
position in which it formerly stood to every other State’.
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moment at which it ‘possesses the marks of a state’ as de1 ned by international law), this 
is immediately quali1 ed in two ways. First, since international law is fundamentally rela-
tional, the ‘theoretical’ existence of the State remains precisely that—theoretical—until 
placed in a social context, and recognition thus marks the commencement of the State 
for practical purposes. Secondly, the ful1 lment of the criteria for statehood (which, of 
course, included such notions as to whether the State was su3  ciently civilized) was in no 
circumstances either self-evident or self-expressive but something that that had to be sub-
ject to the judgment and appreciation. In absence of any other determining mechanism, 
the judgment and appreciation had to be that of existing States. Hall veers, at this point, 
towards the idea that recognition is, in fact, ‘constitutive’ in the sense that the legal exist-
ence of a State is thus dependent upon its recognition by others. But appreciating perhaps 
that this would fatally cut the ground from underneath his 1 rst assertion, Hall 1 nally tries 
to regain his initial standpoint by insisting that this recognition is ultimately merely ‘evi-
dential’ and that the ‘right to be treated as a state’ is independent of, such recognition. In a 
single paragraph, Hall thus seems to occupy all conceivable positions: recognition is both 
declaratory and constitutive; States exist prior to recognition but commence on recogni-
tion; recognition is a duty but also a privilege.
Hall’s equivocation here summarizes in short form much of the ensuing debate over 
the character of recognition in the following century. For the most part those adopting 
a constitutive approach to recognition point to the speciousness of Hall’s theoretical 
 position—however con1 dently a political community might believe itself to have ful1 lled 
the criteria for statehood, it is only through acceptance of that fact by other States, that one 
can say with any assurance that it has. It is meaningless to assert that Abkhazia, North 
Ossetia, or Taiwan are States if no one is prepared to accept them as such. 0 ose, by con-
trast, adopting a declaratory approach point to the political and discretionary character of 
recognition—to the fact that, as in the Tinoco Arbitration, a State like the UK may refuse to 
recognize another (government in that case) not because of any perceived defect in origin 
or competence, but simply because it does not wish to have diplomatic relations with it.55 
0 e determinants of statehood must, therefore, must be posited as anterior to the practice 
of recognition even if the latter may be thought to provide evidence for the former.
To a large extent the respective positions on the question of recognition turn, not so 
much on the question as to whether the existence of a State is a self-expressive fact, or upon 
the ful1 lment or lack thereof of the requisite criteria, but upon the analytical relationship 
between the two elements of ‘status’ and ‘relations’. In one (the declaratory approach) these 
are kept distinct: the question of status has to be determined prior to the creation of rela-
tions with others. Only those entities ful1 lling the requisite criteria can be said to have 
the capacity to enter into legal relations with others as States. In the other, the two issues 
are merged such that the existence or otherwise of such relations becomes the mode by 
which status is determined. Only those entities having relations with other States can be 
assumed to have the legal capacity to do so. 0 e di3  culty with the declaratory position is 
that it seeks to maintain both the idea that the creation of States is rule-governed, and that 
the conferral or withholding of recognition is an essentially political and discretionary 
act. To postulate the existence of a rule, but then deny it any ground for being applied is to 
rely rather heavily upon the self-executory character of formal rule. 0 e di3  culty with the 
55 Tinoco Arbitration (Costa Rica v Great Britain) (1923) 1 RIAA 369; (1924) 18 AJIL 147 at p 154.
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constitutive position, by contrast, is that it seeks to maintain that the conferral or with-
holding of recognition is a legal act (or at least one with legal e2 ects) but that in the absence 
of either a ‘duty to recognize’ (as asserted by Lauterpacht, 1947) or of the existence of an 
agency competent to adjudicate (as asserted by Dugard, 1987), then allows the question 
of status to become entirely dependent upon the individual position of the recognizing 
States. 0 e best one could say, in any particular context, was that a political community 
was ‘more or less’ a State.
For the most part, although many profess to prefer the ‘declaratory approach’ (support 
for which is found, once again, in the Montevideo Convention),56 doctrine on recogni-
tion remains fundamentally ambivalent on most of these key questions.57 0 ere are two 
particular di3  culties. To begin with, it is clear that recognition of another State will have 
certain legal implications: it implies, at the very least, a commitment to respect the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the State it has recognized and will also have a range of 
domestic legal consequences as might concern the recognition of its law and legal transac-
tions occurring within its jurisdiction. By the same token, it is almost universally held that 
recognition will not necessarily imply a willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with 
that other State nor indeed, a recognition of its government (prior to 2001, for example, 
only three States recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, yet there was 
no doubt that all recognized the State of Afghanistan). 0 e di3  culty, however, is that it is 
frequently impossible to entirely dissociate the fact of recognition from the idea of political 
approval. 0 is was typically a problem of particular acuteness in the context of govern-
mental recognition (relevant primarily in case of those governments establishing their 
authority by unconstitutional means) and led to the enunciation by the Mexican Secretary 
of Foreign Relations of what became known as the ‘Estrada Doctrine’ the e2 ect of which 
was to recommend the recognition of all e2 ective governments irrespective of the means 
by which they came to power (Jessup, 1931). 0 at this never quite avoided the problem 
(given that there would still be questions of interpretation in cases in which there were two 
rival governments competing for power) recommended a general abandonment of the pol-
icy of formally recognizing any governments at all (a policy which the British Government 
belatedly adopted in 1980) (for a critique of this position see Talmon, 1998, pp 3–14).
0 e di3  culty of separating law from policy, however, was not con1 ned to govern-
mental recognition, but also in8 uenced practice in relation to the recognition of States. 
Whilst non-recognition, as observed above, has been employed as a way of signalling 
the international community’s condemnation of attempts to subvert processes of self-
 determination or to establish new States by recourse to force, the fact that it is also still 
seen to be an  essentially ‘discretionary act that other States may perform when they 
choose and in the manner of their own choosing’, 58 is such as to make it a somewhat hap-
hazard semeiotic device. In an enlightening typology, Warbrick (1997, pp 10–11) explains 
56 Article 3: ‘0 e political existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other States’ and 
Article 6: ‘0 e recognition of a State merely signi1 es that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality 
of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law’). See also, Badinter Commission, 
Opinions 8 and 10, 92 ILR 201, 206 (1992).
57 See Brownlie, 1982: ‘in the case of “recognition”, theory has not only failed to enhance the subject but 
has created a tertium quid which stands, like a bank of fog on a still day, between the observer and the con-
tours of the ground which calls for investigation’.
58 Badinter Commission, Opinion No 10 of 1992, 92 ILR 206, p 208.
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that the mere statement ‘We (State A) do not recognize entity X as a State’ has at least 1 ve 
possible meanings:
(1) We take no decision, one way or another, about recognizing X [in A’s eyes, X may or 
may not be a State];
(2) We have chosen not to recognize X (although we could do) for political reasons not 
related to X’s status [by implication, A does consider X to be a State];
(3) We do not recognize X because it would be unlawful/premature for us to do so [A 
does not regard X as legally a State];
(4) We do not recognize X, although it might (appear to) be a State, because there are 
customary law obligations or speci1 c treaty obligations which prohibit us from 
doing so;
(5) We do not recognize X, although it might (appear to) be a State, because there is a 
speci1 c obligation imposed by the Security Council not to do so.
Much would seem to depend, thus, upon how the recognizing State would characterize 
or understand its own actions. Only by looking behind the refusal to recognize might 
one determine a di2 erence in stance, for example, between the refusal to recognize the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (informed, it seems, by a re8 ection upon the illegal-
ity of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus) and the similar refusal to recognize the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in early 1992 (informed, it seems, by an unwillingness 
to prejudice diplomatic relations with Greece). In some cases, however, the position is 
simply opaque. It was never entirely clear, for example, as to whether those Arab States 
which refused to recognize the State of Israel before 1993, really believed that Israel did 
not exist as a State (and hence was not bound by the various treaty obligations to which 
it was a party), or merely desired to make clear that it should not exist even if it did so in 
fact. 0 is poses a particular problem since just as it seems necessary to read recognition 
policy symptomatically (as being fundamentally an expression of something else), so also 
the result of such an enquiry might actually make it more, rather than less, di3  cult to 
disentangle those considerations that bear upon the question of legal status and those 
that apparently do not.
0 is relates to a second di3  culty with the practice of recognition namely that even in 
cases in which States have taken a 1 rm position in seeking to avoid recognition of a State 
(and hence avoid any sense of condoning its existence) they are not infrequently unable or 
unwilling to live with the consequences. As pointed out, it seemed unlikely that the Arab 
States, in refusing to recognize Israel, also believed that Israel was not therefore bound by 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in relation to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, 
or that it was otherwise free to ignore general principles of international law governing the 
use of force. Once again, their position was one of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. 
In a more explicit sense, however, domestic courts have also frequently sought to avoid the 
consequences of non-recognition policies, and have resorted to a variety of di2 erent expe-
dients to allow judicial cognition of the laws of what are formally unrecognized States. In 
the Carl Zeiss case, for example, the House of Lords avoided the obvious consequences of 
the British government’s refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic by treating 
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the legislative acts of the GDR as essentially those of the USSR.59 Similarly, in Hesperides 
Hotels, Lord Denning adopted a policy, already well established in the United States, to 
allow recognition of the laws of unrecognized States (in that case the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus) insofar as they related to ‘the day to day a2 airs of the people, such as 
their marriages, their divorces, their leases, their occupations and so forth’.60 In the UK, in 
fact, this latter policy has come to 1 nd formal expression in the Foreign Corporations Act 
of 1991 which states that foreign corporations having status under the laws of an unrec-
ognized State may nevertheless be treated as a legal person if those laws are ‘applied by a 
settled court system in that territory’. In each of these cases, an important consideration 
seems to have been a concern to insulate the ‘innocent’ population from the ‘illegalities’ 
associated with the claims to authority on the part of their governments; but they also 
illustrate in some ways a continued prevarication between the need, on the one hand, to 
recognize ‘e2 ective’ entities whilst, on the other, to ensure at least the semblance of some 
commitment to the legal values that a refusal to recognize might have embodied.
More o! en than not, this dual commitment to admitting the reality of a situation 
whilst not accepting its ‘legality’ is spoken of in terms of ‘pragmatism’. A pragmatist, in 
this sense, seems to be one who is not willing to commit to legal principle to the point 
at which it is disadvantageous either to the recognizing State or, as suggested above, to 
the population concerned. It bespeaks of an opposition to either a rigid commitment to 
the formal rule, or of a refusal to recognize the need to accept, in an imperfect world, 
imperfect solutions. Yet what this characterization of the situation misses is that the 
counterpoint is not between ‘law’ and ‘reality’ (or indeed any other alternative to ‘law’) 
but a counterpoint that has always existed within international law itself. Just as, in the 
past, the distinction between recognition de jure and recognition de facto, allowed States 
the opportunity to have dealings with insurgent governments without, at the same time, 
being seen to implicate themselves to overtly in an act of intervention (see Baty, 1936, 
p 378), so also the practice of recognizing the acts of certain governments whilst not 
recognizing their claims to statehood itself is one that really just goes to the point that 
legal doctrine has consistently sought to embed both law and fact within itself (however 
contradictory that might seem).
If doctrine on statehood and recognition seems to admit the necessity of a constructive 
ambiguity, perhaps the most obviously anomalous (or is that representative?) case is that 
of Taiwan (Crawford, 2006, pp 198–221). Having formerly been recognized as the govern-
ment of China until 1971, Taiwan then was removed from the United Nations and replaced 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Since then, it has never entirely 
renounced its claim to be the government of China, nor unequivocally asserted its exist-
ence as an independent State. Taiwan nevertheless has many dealings with other States 
largely on the same basis as any other State (but without the same diplomatic privileges). 
Taiwanese government agencies are o! en regarded as having legal status in other coun-
tries and a capacity to sue and be sued. It is a party to a number of treaties and has mem-
bership in the WTO (as a ‘Separate Customs Territory’ under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’). 
In the UK, Taiwanese corporations are allowed to do business under the terms of the 1991 
59 Carl-Zeiss-Sti" ung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853.
60 Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd [1978] QB 205 at p 218.
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Foreign Corporations Act ‘as if ’ Taiwan was a recognized State, and in the US relations 
have largely been ‘normalized’ under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act 1979 which 
seeks to implement the policy of maintaining ‘uno3  cial relations’. As Crawford observes 
‘[i]t is surprising it does not su2 er from schizophrenia’ (Crawford, 2006, p 220). 0 e same 
might be said of international lawyers more generally.
VII. conclusion
In an article written in the early 1990s, Martti Koskenniemi re8 ected upon the contempo-
rary resonance of Engel’s notion of the ‘withering away’ of the State. In his view, there were 
two versions of this thesis in circulation. One was a ‘sociological’ version that, on observ-
ing the recent globalization of politics, argues that ‘states are no longer able to handle 
problems such as massive poverty, pollution of the atmosphere, or even their own security’ 
without entering into forms of cooperation that entail the ‘gradual dissolution of sover-
eignty’ (Koskenniemi, 1994b, p 22). 0 e other was an ‘ethical’ version that regards state-
hood as a form of ‘morally indefensible egotism’ that either serves to create and perpetuate 
‘arti1 cial distinctions among members of the human community’ or to justify the use of 
State apparatus for oppression. Each of these critiques stresses the arti1 ciality of the State 
as an idea or institution; each also sees its withering away as essentially bene1 cial.
0 e point of Koskenniemi’s article was not so much to defend the State as an institu-
tion as against these two critiques, but rather to defend the idea of the State as a place (or 
a language) in which various conceptions of justice, right or economic e3  ciency might be 
worked out on an ongoing basis. What informs his argument here is that both versions of 
the thesis tend to take as ‘given’ that which they are using as the point of critique:
0 e problem with the critiques of the state is their inability to reach into what is authentic 
and agree on what it requires in terms of political action. In suggesting that we must realize 
something that is already there—and in consequently de-emphasizing the decision proc-
esses needed to get there—the critiques function as political ideologies, and their claim to 
spontaneity, following Adorno, is ‘a jargon of authenticity’ instead of an expression of some 
hidden truth.’ [footnotes omitted] (Koskenniemi, 1994b, p 22)
To posit, in other words, the withering away of the State on the basis that it is either a socio-
logical necessity or ethically desirable omits to re8 ect upon the unstable, or at the very 
least contestable, character of either the sociology or ethics that underpin them. 0 e ‘fact’ 
of globalization or the ‘justice’ of certain rights claims may, a! er all, look very di2 erent in 
di2 erent parts of the world.
0 e resonance of Koskenniemi’s observations here, however, relate to more than merely 
a re8 ection upon the debates over globalization, human rights or the survival of the 
State as an institution, but more generally to the question surrounding the relationship 
between international law and the condition of statehood. 0 e two key standpoints that 
Koskenniemi highlights—the ethical and the sociological—operate not merely as stand-
points external to the State, but rather run through the discourses on sovereignty, self-
determination, legitimacy, and recognition that constitute the very idea of the State in 
the 1 rst place. 0 ere is a constant equivocation, in all such discussions, as to whether the 
world is to be taken ‘as it is’ (in which we might be inclined to treat statehood as a question 
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of fact, e2 ectiveness as the primary condition, recognition as declaratory and sovereignty 
as innate), or as something which must be engineered to correspond to those values which 
we take to be universal and necessary (in which case, we might treat statehood as being 
a matter of law, self-determination or democratic legitimacy as primary conditions, rec-
ognition as quasi-constitutive, and sovereignty as delegated and conditional). To note the 
equivocation, here, however is to advert to the untenable character of either position. We 
can no more rely upon the assumption that States simply exist independently of the rela-
tions they have with others (the supposed ‘authenticity of the real’) than we can upon the 
assumption that justice always lies in the hands of those who have the capacity to speak its 
name (the supposed ‘authenticity of the ethical’).
One of the purposes of this chapter, however, has been to explain how many of these 
seemingly abstract theoretical arguments about recognition, statehood or sovereignty 
had a de1 nitive context, namely that which arose as a consequence of the European 
engagement with the non-European world in the late nineteenth century. 0 e di3  culties 
associated with both seeking to delimit, in a descriptive sense, the geographical orien-
tation of international law by reference to the pre-existence of European nation states, 
but  simultaneously employ a prescriptive of notion of statehood as a way of supervis-
ing the ‘entry’ of new States into the family of nations, have largely conditioned many 
of the theoretical puzzles that subsequently emerged. Statehood is both presumed and 
regulated, recognition both constitutive and declaratory, sovereignty both a source of 
right and a product of law, self-determination both an expression of autonomy and a 
product of prior-regulation. Running through those debates has always been a dynamic 
of inclusion and exclusion which, in the past, served as a way of negotiating in a complex 
way the relationship with the non-European world, but in more recent times has come 
to mark the various projects and proposals associated with the identi1 cation of new 
categories: failed States, rogue States, illiberal or illegitimate States. In many cases such 
projects have been initiated on the premise that they are seeking to avoid or cast aside 
the authoritarian characteristics of what they take to be a nineteenth century ‘positivist’ 
international law, but have strangely re-appropriated precisely the same structures of 
thought or argument.
In all of this, however, what may be remarked upon is the relative strength within inter-
national legal thought of what might be called a civic republican tradition that, recalling 
Kant’s project of perpetual peace, forges a rough alignment between the idea of the State 
as a civic enterprise the object of which is to guarantee individual human rights and 
freedoms, of sovereignty as a set of entitlements conditioned by the government’s demo-
cratic credentials (or ability to ful1 l its mandate), of international law as a cosmopolitan 
order that supervises and regulates the relationship between those largely arbitrary col-
lections of individuals and agencies, and of international organizations as the nascent 
institutional expression of the values and interests of the international community writ 
large. In this account, the place of community, culture or tradition is assigned no direct 
role and may merely occupy the spaces le!  available to it within that framework—as that 
which marks participation within a minority or indigenous community, or as that which 
is engendered by the State through the institutional apparatus of government (national-
ism as a political agenda). In the same sense, the State as an institution becomes ultim-
ately vulnerable to an essentially instrumental critique: either it does its job and can be 
justi1 ed on that basis, or it doesn’t and can’t. 0 is, in many ways, does seem to represent 
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the key shi!  in legal thought that has occurred over the course of the last century, but it 
is one that is strangely quiet on the key questions Koskenniemi poses for it: how does it 
claim authenticity for the values that it proclaims and what kind of political action does 
it entail?
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